PERSPECTIVE TAKING AND THE SECURITY DILEMMA:
Cross-National Experimental Evidence from China and the United States

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ABSTRACT: One of the central challenges in China-US relations is the risk of a security dilemma between China and the United States, as each side carries out actions for defensively-motivated reasons, but fails to realize how it is perceived by the other side. Yet how susceptible to security dilemma thinking are the Chinese and American publics? Can its deleterious effects be mitigated? We explore the individual-level micro-foundations of security dilemma thinking, fielding parallel dyadic cross-national survey experiments in China and the United States. We find micro-level evidence consistent with the logic of the security dilemma in publics in both countries. We also find that IR scholars have overstated the palliative effects of perspective taking, which can backfire in the face of perceived threats to actors’ identities and goals. Our findings have important implications for the study of public opinion in China-US relations, and perspective taking in IR.

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Peacefully managing the rise of China is the most pressing foreign policy challenge of the 21st century (Mearsheimer, 2001; Christensen, 2006). Scholars and policymakers who are worried about the risks associated with China’s rise are worried about two phenomena. The first involves the hegemonic wars envisioned by power transition theory (Gilpin, 1981; Kugler and Lemke, 2000; Allison, 2017). The second involves conflicts that can occur between two security-seeking states: the notion of a security dilemma (Herz, 1950; Butterfield, 1951).

Central to the idea of a security dilemma is a dynamic in which one state carries out actions for defensively-motivated reasons, but fails to appreciate how it will be perceived by the other side, leading to a spiral model of conflict that no actor actually wants (Jervis, 1978; Glaser, 1997; Booth and Wheeler, 2008; Tang, 2009; Mitzen and Schweller, 2011). Security dilemmas are a byproduct of the uncertainty generated by the anarchic structure of the international system, but they are also about failures of perspective taking — the inability of one actor to successfully put itself in the shoes of the other.

In this paper, we experimentally explore the microfoundations of perspective taking in the security dilemma. We are interested in two questions. First of all, in an era when pundits routinely express concern about publics in China and the US being on a collision course with one another, how susceptible are the two countries to security dilemma thinking? Second, given IR scholars’ persistent interest in the palliative effects of empathy and perspective taking in promoting international cooperation (e.g. Jervis, 1976; White, 1986; Keller and Yang, 2009; Holmes and Yarhi-Milo, 2017), what role can perspective taking play in dampening security dilemma dynamics? If security dilemmas are about failures of empathy, does inducing perspective taking and encouraging citizens from different countries to step into each other’s shoes mitigate security dilemma thinking’s deleterious effects?

We explore these questions using a series of cross-national survey experiments fielded in both China and the United States, where we present participants in both countries with a scenario in the South China Sea, manipulate the behavior of the other side, and examine its effects on policy preferences. We find micro-level evidence consistent with the attributional asymmetry that constitutes security dilemma thinking: respondents in both countries are susceptible to spiral models of conflict, viewing behavior as offensively-motivated when carried out by the other side, and defensively-motivated when carried out by their own. Respondents in China are especially prone to security dilemma thinking, due partly to the hostile image they have of the United States. We also find that perspective taking is a double-edged sword, because its effects are conditional on the
knowledge structures it activates: experimentally inducing American participants to think about the conclusions the Chinese would draw from their behavior increases the likelihood of endorsing a policy of reciprocity, but doing the same for Chinese participants can actually increase the likelihood of endorsing escalation, due to differences in threat perception by each side. Our findings have important implications for both theory and policy, improving our understanding of the logic of the security dilemma and the role of the mass public in either accelerating or inhibiting assertive foreign policies in Chinese-US relations, and adding a cautionary note to the conventional wisdom about the palliative effects of perspective taking in foreign affairs.

The discussion that follows has four parts. We begin by reviewing the security dilemma, a classic framework in IR whose resonance has only increased in light of growing tensions in the South China Sea. We then show how psychological models of the security dilemma carve out a particularly important role for perspective-taking, a cognitive form of empathy that plays a crucial role in strategic behavior more generally. Although IR scholars tend to emphasize perspective taking’s palliative effects, it can also have a dark side, particularly when actors perceive threats to their identities or goals. We then discuss the mechanics of our cross-national experiments, before presenting our findings. Finally we conclude with implications for theory and policy.

1 The security dilemma in US-China relations

Policymakers and political scientists preoccupied with the predicament posed by a rising China (e.g. Christensen, 1999; Mearsheimer, 2001; Johnston, 2003; Medeiros and Fravel, 2003; Friedberg, 2005; Gries, 2005; Goldstein, 2005; Christensen, 2006; Ikenberry, 2008; Ross, 2009; Schweller and Pu, 2011; Chen, Pu and Johnston, 2014; Johnston, 2017) typically focus on one of two phenomena.\footnote{The 2012 TRIP survey suggests the strategic importance of peacefully managing China’s rise is shared by both academics and policymakers alike, topping the list of foreign-policy problems facing the United States provided by both IR scholars in the United States, and national security practitioners within the US government. See https://www.wm.edu/offices/itpir/_documents/trip/ivory_tower_survey_2012.pdf.}

The first is the specter of hegemonic war. As Gilpin (1981) argued, the international political order tends to reflect the interest of the most powerful states in the system; as the balance of power shifts due to the law of uneven growth, the newly powerful will attempt to change the system to better reflect their interests. Declining hegemons, then, have an incentive to wage preventive war in order to forestall the rising power’s rise (Levy, 1987), such that periods of power transition have historically tended to be periods of instability (Kugler and Lemke, 2000; Allison, 2017). Importantly,
however, the dire predictions of power transition theory are contingent upon the rising power being a revisionist state, seeking to overturn the established order. If China is invested in the existing international political order — an arrangement that enabled it to lift nearly three quarters of a billion people out of poverty over the past several decades — then no conflict should occur.

The second is the security dilemma (Herz, 1950; Butterfield, 1951). As Booth and Wheeler (2008, 4-8) and Tang (2009) note, IR scholars use the term in a wide variety of contradictory ways, but often beginning with the premise that because of the anarchic structure of the international system, states are fundamentally uncertain about the intentions of others (Waltz, 1979; Copeland, 2000; Mearsheimer, 2001). When one state takes actions that are intended only to bolster its own security, other states are likely to assume the worst, and erroneously interpret a defensively-motivated action as an offensively-motivated one. The result is what Jervis (1976) calls the “spiral model” of conflict, where war no one wants emerges as a result of misperceptions that neither side can shake off (Glaser, 1997; Tang, 2009; Mitzen and Schweller, 2011). Thus, whereas hegemonic war only occurs when one of the actors is a revisionist state, the security dilemma can occur even among two states supportive of the status quo. Concerns about potential security dilemmas in East Asia — whether between China and the United States, or between China and America’s allies in the region — thus loom large in much of the East Asian security scholarship (e.g. Christensen, 1999, 2002; Liff and Ikenberry, 2014; Breuer and Johnston, 2019), with Western scholars warning of a “growing security dilemma which could spiral into a regional arms race, destabilizing Asia and increasing the chance of conflict if there is not a swift shift in direction” (Ludwig, 2017). Yet Chinese scholars have recently made similar arguments, suggesting that “the South China Sea dispute has become the ‘security dilemma’ of the two countries” ( 南海成为两国的“安全困境”), or looking for ways for the US and China to “step over the trap of ‘security dilemmas’ in the South China Sea” (并进而跨越南海“安全困境”的陷阱).2

What unites these two worst-case scenarios is the challenge of assessing intentions (Yarhi-Milo, 2014). Because hegemonic wars depend on the rising power harboring revisionist intentions, debates in Washington over how the United States should handle a rising China — whether we should engage China and enmesh it in international institutions (Ikenberry, 2008), reassure China by using reciproc-

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cal gestures to reduce tensions (Steinberg and O’Hanlon, 2014), contain it militarily (Mearsheimer, 2014), or some combination thereof — are partially debates about future states of the world (e.g. how much will Chinese economic growth slow? How much will Chinese nationalism rise?), but are also debates about what China wants (Johnston, 2003). Ultimately, American grand strategy debates over the Asia-Pacific hinge on the fundamental challenge of overcoming “the problem of other minds” (Herrmann, 1988) and accurately assessing the motivations of others. As Butterfield (1951, 154) noted when coining what he referred to as the “irreducible dilemma”, these same issues serve as the core of the security dilemma as well. For our purposes here, we call these psychological microfoundations security dilemma thinking, which has two components. First, actors display an attribution asymmetry, in which they attribute offensive motivations to others for behavior they would perceive as defensively motivated if carried out by their own side, each side espousing “benign memes about the Self and malign memes about the Other” (Breuer and Johnston, 2019, 432). Second, as a result of this attribution asymmetry, actors become more likely to want to escalate, leading to a potential spiral of conflict as each side responds to one another’s actions. Johnston (2003, 50) notes that this interactivity can even take the form of “malign reciprocation”, where “conflictual moves reciprocate both conflictual and cooperative actions.” Our focus in this piece, then, is not in testing whether the macro-level US-China relationship in the South China Sea can be best characterized by a security dilemma — although as we note above, political scientists in both China and the United States frequently characterize it as such — but rather, whether we find micro-level evidence of security dilemma thinking in American and Chinese respondents.

IR scholars have pointed to two potential sets of solutions to security dilemma thinking. The first, frequently emphasized in rationalist models, involves costly signals of reassurance, in which states carry out actions that only defensively-motivated states would take in order to convince others of their trustworthiness (Kydd, 2005). Yet models of costly signaling assume that the meaning of

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3The question of classifying disputes as security dilemmas is somewhat intractable, as evident by Jervis’s lament that political scientists remain divided about whether the First World War was a security dilemma, a century later. There are three challenges here. First, these debates tend to hinge on what each side’s true motivations are, which is complicated by the problem of other minds (Herrmann, 1988). Second, political scientists cannot agree on the necessary components of a security dilemma, as is evident in the spirited disagreements between Jervis (1978); Glaser (1997); Booth and Wheeler (2008); Tang (2009); Mitzen and Schweller (2011); focusing on the perceptual patterns we call security dilemma thinking allows us to deliberately sidestep these debates. Third is the problem of motivated reasoning (Kertzer, Rathbun and Rathbun, 2020). As Turner and Nymalm (2019) note, there is a Eurocentric bias in the IR literature in terms of who we characterize as status quo versus revisionist powers; it’s as obvious to many Western observers that China is revisionist – as is proclaimed in the 2018 National Defense Strategy – as it’s obvious to many Chinese observers that the United States is revisionist, with observers on each side relying on different reference points to back up their claims. Paradoxically, then, our susceptibility to security dilemma thinking makes it harder for us to agree on whether security dilemmas exist in given situations.
signals are obvious to observers, and psychological research suggests that signals may not always speak for themselves (Kertzer, Rathbun and Rathbun, 2020), or be as effective as we might hope (Yoder and Haynes, Forthcoming). The second, looming large in psychological models of the security dilemma (e.g. Jervis, 1978; Booth and Wheeler, 2008; Baker, 2019), and our interest here, concerns perspective taking.

1.1 The palliative effect of perspective taking

Perspective taking is a psychological faculty that involves the ability or willingness to put oneself in others’ shoes. Because of its centrality to theories of symbolic interactionism, perspective taking is often associated with constructivist scholarship (e.g. Wendt, 1999, 333), but perspective taking is fundamental to all theories of strategic behavior: because strategic situations are those where “the best course of action for each player depends on what other players do” (Schelling, 1960, 3, fn. 1), acting strategically requires anticipating the behavior of others, which requires the capacity to see the situation from someone else’s eyes. Indeed, Singer and Fehr (2005, 340) note that all of “the most fundamental solution concepts in game theory (Nash equilibrium, backward induction, and iterated elimination of dominated strategies)” depend on some form on this faculty.

In games of complete information, perspective taking is trivial: every player already knows what the other players want and believe as a matter of design. In natural settings, however, there are a number of obstacles, most fundamental of which is the “problem of other minds”: our inability to directly access the mental states of others (Morgenthau, 1985; Herrmann, 1988). In international politics, the problem is exacerbated by the anarchic structure of the international system, in which states are fundamentally uncertain about the intentions of others, who have incentives to misrepresent their private information (Fearon, 1995).

It should not be surprising, then, that many unsavory outcomes in international politics are frequently chalked up to failures of actors to put themselves in others’ shoes, particularly in the voluminous literature on misperceptions in international politics. Stein (1988, 249-250) notes that threat perceptions are hamstrung by a “lack of empathy”, in that “political leaders often display no

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4Perspective taking is often understood as a cognitive form of empathy, such that some political scientists write of “strategic empathy” (Shore, 2014; Waldman, 2014), although empathy is used in a wide variety of ways in political science (e.g. Keohane, 1984; Head, 2016), and the relationship between empathy and perspective taking varies in the psychological literature: in some work, perspective taking is seen as a cause of empathy (Decety, 2005), while others see empathy as a specific subtype of empathy (Davis, 1980), and others still see empathy as a specific subtype of perspective taking (Mohr et al., 2013). We sidestep these debates for our purposes, apart from noting the connections between the two constructs.

Just as IR scholars have tended to attribute miscalculations and undesirable outcomes to insufficient perspective taking, they frequently link perspective taking to positive or prosocial behavior. This is the logic underlying intergroup contact theory (Pettigrew, 1998), one of the motivations behind foreign exchanges (Atkinson, 2010), and a variety of conflict resolution mechanisms (Batson and Ahmad, 2009), including prejudice-reduction interventions (Paluck, 2010; Simonovits, Kézdi and Kardos, 2018; Adida, Lo and Platas, 2018). Holmes (2018) and Holmes and Yarhi-Milo (2017) argue face-to-face diplomacy is helpful because it better permits negotiators to reach mutual understanding; one of the frequently-issued arguments in favor of area studies expertise in policymaking is that a wealth of local knowledge helps decision-makers better take the other side’s perspective (White, 1986; Waldman, 2014).

These positive effects are often posited to extend to security dilemma thinking. In his influential discussions of the security dilemma, Jervis (1978, 181) discusses environmental features that make security dilemmas more likely to occur, but also explicitly attributes security dilemma thinking to “failures of empathy”, and notes that “empathy and skillful statesmanship can reduce this danger" (p. 212). An ability to put oneself in others’ shoes is also central to what Booth and Wheeler (2008) call “security dilemma sensibility", crucial to breaking out of the dilemma. Most recently, Baker (2019, 2) argues that an ability to place oneself in the shoes of others is “pivotal to the de-escalation of security dilemma dynamics." The logic of these arguments about the palliative effects of perspective taking are straightforward: if the security dilemma is a failure of perspective taking, engaging in perspective taking will cause actors to better appreciate the effects their actions have on others, and be less likely to assume others’ actions are offensively motivated.
1.2 The dark side of perspective taking

Although the IR literature tends to view perspective taking through panglossian lenses, the psychological literature's findings are more mixed. One concern, which we discuss more in Appendix §4.3, concerns questions of accuracy: most of us aren’t very good at perspective taking, and a propensity or willingness to put oneself in others’ shoes doesn’t mean the inferences drawn will be correct (Epley and Caruso, 2008). Most relevant for our purposes, however, is that perspective taking also has a dark side (Sassenrath, Hodges and Pfattheicher, 2016). Cognitively, perspective taking causes us to activate knowledge structures both about ourself and the target whose perspective we are taking (Ku, Wang and Galinsky, 2010), such that the effect of perspective taking depends on the content of the knowledge structures being activated (Vorauer, 2013). In particular, perspective taking can backfire and lead to conflict rather than cooperation when mixed with two ingredients often present in IR.

The first is threats to one’s identity. When actors engage in perspective taking, they engage in self-other overlap, in which they both project more of themselves onto the target, and see more of the target in themselves (Sassenrath, Hodges and Pfattheicher, 2016). When actors with strong emotional attachment to their ingroup take the perspective of an outgroup member, it can therefore constitute a threat to their social identity, leading to outgroup derogation (Tarrant, Calitri and Weston, 2012). Perspective taking’s effects should therefore be more negative when nationalism is thrown into the mix, as individuals who derive self-esteem from their membership in the national community attempt to take the perspective of the outgroup. These effects should be further exacerbated when taking the perspective not just of an individual member of the outgroup — as is often the case in prejudice-reduction interventions — but of the outgroup as a whole (Barth and Stürmer, 2016).

The second is threats to one’s goals. A growing literature in social psychology finds that perspective taking can lead to more negative attitudes or behavior when actors take the perspective of a group seen as threatening their motivations or goals, as in circumstances where actors perceive negative goal interdependence with the outgroup (Okimoto and Wenzel, 2011; Mooijman and Stern, 2016; Sassenrath, Hodges and Pfattheicher, 2016). If perspective taking is an inherent part of strategy, it is because considering the potential reactions of others is part of defining the strategic environment.
one faces. It does not, however, transform the underlying nature of that environment; it can illuminate the existence of complementary interests where they exist, but cannot transform conflicting interests into harmony (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985). In an innovative set of experiments, Caruso, Epley and Bazerman (2006) (see also Epley, Caruso and Bazerman, 2006) studied perspective taking in the context of two classic games in the social sciences: the prisoners’ dilemma, and trust games. In the prisoners’ dilemma experiment, participants in the control condition were administered the classic prisoners’ dilemma game, where participants are shown a payoff matrix and asked whether they would like to cooperate or defect (the dominant strategy, but which leaves players collectively worse off). Participants in the treatment condition completed the same task, but were also given a perspective taking manipulation that encouraged them to first consider the thoughts of their opponent; participants who were encouraged to engage in perspective taking were twice as likely to defect as those in the control. In the trust game, participants in the control condition were administered the standard trust game from behavioral economics, in which participants are given a sum of money, and have to choose how much to allocate to another player, who invests the money and then decides how much of the proceeds to return to the original player; the initial amount allocated is used as a measure of trust. When a perspective taking treatment was added, players were significantly less trusting than in the control. Pierce et al. (2013, 1986) similarly find that in competitive contexts, “perspective taking is akin to pouring gasoline on a fire”, effectively transforming “the Golden Rule from ‘do unto others as you would have them do unto you’ to ‘do unto others as you think they will try to do unto you.’” In contexts where actors are seen as having opposing goals, perspective taking can therefore make cooperation less likely, by heightening our awareness of conflicts of interest. In an IR context, since threat perceptions are a function of both perceived capabilities and intentions (e.g. Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995; Stein, 2013), this tendency for perspective taking to have negative effects in situations of perceived negative goal interdependence is particularly likely to occur when the target is seen as significantly stronger in capabilities, wherein the threats they pose to an actor’s goals will be seen as more severe.

Together, these considerations suggest a number of important implications for the effects of perspective taking in minimizing potential security dilemma thinking in the United States and China. Most importantly, because the effects of perspective taking depend on the knowledge structures it activates, perspective taking will have heterogeneous effects. Among individuals who perceive threats to their identities or interests, taking the perspective of the other side can not only fail
to produce palliative effects, but can even backfire, increasing preferences for escalation. Since the knowledge structures perspective taking activates are likely to vary across countries, however, perspective taking’s effects should vary cross-nationally as well. In the context of US-China relations, perspective taking should be more likely to increase escalatory preferences among the Chinese — who perceive greater threat from the United States than Americans perceive from China.

Importantly, our theory of perspective taking’s contingent effects acknowledges the role of both cognition and context. If the objects under a dispute have different meanings to different actors, perspective taking will activate different knowledge structures, leading to different effects. Yet it also does so without falling prey to essentialism: unlike theories from cross-cultural psychology that posit that Westerners and Asians inherently engage in perspective taking differently (Wu and Keysar, 2007; Chopik, O’Brien and Konrath, 2017), our theory predicts that perspective taking should have similar effects across groups when perceivers on both sides define the situation in similar ways.

2 Methods

To look for evidence of security dilemma thinking, and explore the potential effects of perspective taking in the context of US-China relations, we conducted a pair of cross-national survey experiments in China and the US in the spring of 2016, in which we presented an identical set of experimental modules to diverse national samples targeted to match census demographics in both countries at the same time. In this sense, our interest is in studying the psychological microfoundations of security dilemma thinking in the mass public, rather than elite decision-makers. In experimental research, Tingley (2017) and Gries and Jing (2019) find that many members of the American public tend to think of a rising China using the same commitment problem framing that underlies models of preventive war. Understanding how susceptible the US public is to security dilemma thinking — and thereby offering the first experimental study of the security dilemma’s psychological microfoundations — is a similarly worthy endeavor.

Yet understanding whether similar patterns exist in Chinese public opinion is also important. One major concern among Western pundits is that the Chinese Communist Party’s domestic legitimacy is tied to maintaining high levels of economic growth; as growth rates inevitably slow, the regime may instead fan the flames of nationalism in the mass public, redirecting discontent away from Beijing and towards foreign actors like the United States (Friedberg, 2005, 29-30). It is for this
reason that outside observers have been so fixated on nationalist sentiment in the Chinese public (Weiss, 2014; Johnston, 2017), particularly if the Chinese government cultivates nationalist protests at home as a way to tie its hands in international negotiations abroad (Weiss, 2013, see also Gries, 2001; Wallace and Weiss, 2015). Ross (2009), for example, argues that China’s maritime buildup is attributable to “naval nationalism” in a public that associates great power status with maritime grandeur. More generally, a recent strand of research on authoritarian accountability suggests that the Chinese government is sensitive to public sentiment in a variety of ways (e.g. Chen, Pan and Xu, 2016; Distelhorst and Hou, 2017; Truex, 2016; Meng, Pan and Ping, 2017). Indeed, despite maintaining an authoritarian regime, the Chinese government spends considerable effort and resources monitoring public opinion (舆情) (Batke and Ohlberg, 2020); Weiss and Dafoe (2019) note that the Chinese government employs two million analysts to monitor public sentiment on Chinese social media, precisely because it is aware of the outsized role that domestic sentiments can play in response to international disputes. Better understanding the dynamics of Chinese public opinion towards the use of force (e.g. Reilly, 2011; Li, Wang and Chen, 2016; Weiss and Dafoe, 2019; Bell and Quek, 2018), is thus a politically consequential task.

In the United States, we fielded our study in English, embedding it in a survey on a national sample of 1820 American adults recruited by Survey Sampling International (SSI), stratified based on census targets for gender, age, household income, and education. In China, we fielded our study in Chinese, embedding it in a national survey that was fielded online to cover all provinces and capital municipalities in Mainland China. Anonymized online surveys are known to reduce social desirability biases and improve response validity, which is particularly important in sensitive environments such as China (e.g. Chang and Krosnick, 2010; Huang, 2015, 630). To conduct our study in China, we partnered with a survey company to recruit a sample of 1,556 Chinese adults (18 years and older) matching the 2010 National Census on gender, age, race, income and geography. Because these subjects were directed to the Qualtrics survey platform at the researcher end, we maintained full control over our experiment and the data collection.

Respondents in both countries were presented with parallel experimental scenarios, involving tensions in the South China Sea between the United States and China. The overall structure

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6 For other recent experiments in political science fielded on SSI, see e.g. Brutger and Kertzer (2018); Quek (2017). For other recent survey experiments in China, see Huang (2015); Bell and Quek (2018); Quek and Johnston (2017/18); Weiss and Dafoe (2019).

7 For more on how our study addressed social desirability bias, see our discussion in Appendix §1.

8 For more details on the survey instrument and translation procedures, see Appendix §2.
Figure 1: Experimental designs

Experimental modules

Introduction
Describe tensions in South China Sea

Perspective-taking module
Manipulate behavior of the other side
- Other side escalates
- Other side de-escalates

Measure DV: Policy Choice
Should your side escalate or de-escalate? Why?

Write task I:
What conclusion would your side draw?

Manipulate perspective-taking

Control

Writing task II:
What would other side conclude if we escalated?

Attribution module
What inferences would you draw if:
- Other side escalates
- Our side escalates

Dispositional questionnaire

Demographics
Foreign policy orientations
Empathy measure (Davis 1983)
Image theory measures (cf Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995)
k-level reasoning (Stahl and Wilson 1995)

Order manipulation
of our study is presented in Figure 1, and the Chinese and English text used in our experiments are reproduced alongside each other in Appendix §3. Respondents in both countries began the experimental portion of the study by reading: “Recently there has been much attention over tensions in the South China Sea. Multiple countries in the region have claimed rights to disputed international waters, which are home to a wealth of natural resources, fisheries, and trade routes — all of which are at stake in the increasingly frequent diplomatic standoffs. [China/The United States] is concerned about the [United States'/China's] assertiveness in the region.” That is to say, respondents in China were told about the United States, while respondents in the United States were told about China.

Respondents then completed two experimental modules, which we refer to as the attribution module, and the perspective taking experiment. The objective and setup of each module are somewhat different. The attribution module has a simple within-subjects design, in which respondents were asked to assess the motivations if each country were to increase its presence in the South China Sea (on a seven point scale ranging from 1 (“for purely defensive reasons”) to 7 (“for purely offensive reasons”)). The purpose of this module is to solicit attributions for the other side’s behavior (Canetti, Gubler and Zeitzoff, 2020), testing for the asymmetrical attribution pattern we associate with security dilemma thinking: to what extent do citizens of each country tend to view the other side’s behavior as more offensively-motivated than one’s own?

The perspective taking experiment has a more elaborate design, which we call a parallel dyadic experimental design. In it, we manipulated the behavior of the other side: thus, respondents in the United States were presented with actions by the Chinese, while respondents in China were presented with actions by the United States. This parallel and interactive structure is one of the innovations of our methodological approach. Although there have been a number of important survey experiments in IR fielded in multiple countries (e.g. Tomz and Weeks, 2013), they tend to be designed to be studied independently, rather than exploring how the dynamics in one country interact with those in another. Indeed, it is striking that whereas the original audience cost model is dyadic and incorporates strategic interactions between both sides (Fearon, 1994), most of the public opinion research testing its microfoundations, like most survey experiment work more generally, has focused solely on results within a single country (e.g. Tomz, 2007; Trager and Vavreck, 2011; Kertzer and Brutger, 2016). In this sense, one of our efforts here is to bridge the divide between the crisis bargaining literature and experimental studies of public opinion, and to follow the exhortations of Johnston (2012), Bell and Quek (2018) and others in directly testing our theories of IR in an East
Asian context.

In the perspective taking experiment, respondents were randomly presented with one of two different actions carried out by the other side. Half the sample considered a scenario in which the other side decided to decrease naval deployments in strategic maritime zones in the South China Sea, whereas the other half of the sample considered a scenario in which the other side decided to increase deployments. To strengthen the treatment, participants were also given a writing task asking them to write out what conclusions their country would draw from that action.

Participants in the control condition were then asked to indicate the extent to which they wanted their country’s military activities to increase or decrease, administered using a branching item used to produce a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (decrease a lot) to 7 (increase a lot). However, prior to being administered this item, participants in the perspective taking treatment condition were induced to engage in perspective taking. Participants in the treatment condition were given an additional writing task, asking them to write what conclusions the other side would draw if their own side were to escalate: that is, Chinese participants in the treatment condition were asked what conclusions the Americans would draw if China were to escalate, while American participants in the treatment condition were asked what conclusions the Chinese would draw if the United States were to escalate. Participants in the treatment condition were then administered the same dependent variable administered to participants in the control. Participants in both conditions were also given an open-ended response asking them to explain their answer. Whereas the purpose of the attribution module is to test for security dilemma thinking, the objective of the perspective taking experiment is to see whether perspective taking can mitigate the escalatory dynamics that follow it.

Importantly, our experimental design is both parallel and asymmetric: although the structure of the experiments are identical across both samples, the knowledge concepts activated by perspective taking in each side are not, since as its name suggests, the South China Sea is closer to China than to the United States, and is of significantly greater salience for the former than the latter. The research design thus deliberately captures one of the key challenges underlying US security

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9 The samples were well balanced across treatments, as shown in Appendix §4.2.
10 Utilizing writing tasks to strengthen treatment dosages is a standard technique in the experimental literature: see e.g. Albertson and Gadarian 2016.
11 The study thus can be thought of as an encouragement design, in that participants were experimentally encouraged to engage in perspective taking, but some individuals may have already been engaging in perspective taking in the control, while others who were administered the treatment may fail to comply with it. We consider the implications for the interpretation of our findings in Appendix §4.1, showing it renders the results reported in the main text a more conservative test.
concerns in East Asia, in which many of the potential disputes the US worries about take place in another great power’s backyard; this is the precise strategic context commentators focus on when discussing potential security dilemmas in US-Chinese relations. In this sense, the experimental design has greater internal validity and mundane realism than one about a hypothetical dispute over a fictional territory equidistant from each country’s mainland. We also fielded a follow-up study of our attribution experiment involving a hypothetical territorial dispute taking place off the shores of Hawaii. This follow-up study, which was fielded in the autumn of 2019 on a convenience sample of N=627 American adults recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, is described in greater detail below.\textsuperscript{12}

Although the study design is somewhat elaborate, it enables us to study five theoretically valuable quantities of interest:

1. By comparing the attributions respondents offer for Chinese and American escalation in the attribution module, we can test the microfoundational assumption of the security dilemma by measuring propensity for security dilemma thinking, indicating how much more offensively-motivated citizens perceive an action to be when it is carried out by the other country rather than by their own.

2. By comparing the average policy choices advocated by American and Chinese respondents in each experimental cell in the perspective taking experiment, we can calculate the baseline level of escalatory preferences advocated by citizens in each country, important for understanding leaders’ domestic incentive structures in a potential dispute between the two countries.

3. By estimating the treatment effect of perspective taking on policy choices, we can test whether experimentally inducing participants to take the perspective of the other side causes them to favor more or less escalatory policies in each country, important for testing the validity of palliative theories of perspective taking.

4. By linking the attribution and perspective taking experiments together, we can test whether perspective taking mitigates the effects of security dilemma thinking — or whether it in fact exacerbates it.

\textsuperscript{12}Following Burleigh, Kennedy and Clifford (2018), we drop respondents using Virtual Private Servers (VPS) to mask their location, or whose locations we could not validate as being in the United States.
5. By estimating the treatment effect of perspective taking on the explanations respondents give for their policy choices, we can test whether experimentally inducing participants to take the perspective of the other side changes the kinds of justifications they offer for their policy preferences, important for understanding the knowledge structures perspective taking activates.

3 Results

We structure our presentation of the results around the five quantities of interest enumerated above. We begin with the attribution module, looking for micro-level evidence consistent with security dilemma thinking by calculating the extent to which respondents in each country displayed asymmetrical attribution patterns, showing that respondents tend to see actions as significantly more offensively-motivated when carried out by the other side. This attribution asymmetry is especially pronounced in China, and is not simply an artifact of the geographic proximity of the South China Sea, but rather reflects a fundamental asymmetry in each side’s perception of the US-China relationship more generally. Having shown that security dilemma thinking exists, we then turn to the perspective taking experiment, showing how perspective taking encourages reciprocity among American respondents, but opportunistic behavior among Chinese respondents. Linking the two experiments together, we show that rather than perspective taking enabling individuals to better escape security dilemma thinking, perspective taking in both countries only displays palliative effects among respondents who aren’t prone to security dilemma thinking in the first place. Finally, we obtain similar findings using a series of Structural Topic Models (STMs) to explore how the perspective taking treatment affects the explanations participants offer for their policy choices.

3.1 Attribution module: identifying security dilemma thinking

At its broadest level, the security dilemma is often understood to be a consequence of asymmetric attributions, as each side perceives their own behavior as defensively-motivated, and the other side’s behavior as offensively-motivated (Jervis, 1978). Our attribution module lets us look for individual-level evidence consistent with this theoretical argument.

We therefore asked participants in our study to assess the motivations for a hypothetical escalation in the South China Sea by each side, on a scale ranging from “For purely defensive reasons” to “For purely offensive reasons." Consistent with the logic of security dilemma thinking, in which
Figure 2: Respondents display the attribution asymmetry consistent with security dilemma thinking

Note: Figure 2 displays the average attribution made by Chinese and American respondents for an escalation by the other side ("They increase") and by their own side ("We increase"). If the attribution made for the other side’s behavior is higher on the scale than the attribution made for one’s own behavior, then the results display an "attribution asymmetry", an asymmetry in the motivation attributed to an identical action carried out by both sides. The steeper the slope of the line connecting the two points, the stronger the asymmetry. Thus, the figure shows that while both sides tend to see their own actions as more defensive and the other side’s actions as more offensive, the Chinese public displays a much stronger attribution asymmetry than the American public, which holds even when we relocate the dispute to the shores of Hawaii in a follow-up study, suggesting this larger attribution asymmetry can’t simply be an artifact of geographic proximity.
actors are more likely to perceive their own behavior as defensively motivated than the behavior of others, the results, presented in Figure 2, reveal a significant attribution asymmetry among both Americans (point estimates depicted in solid blue) and Chinese (point estimates depicted in solid red). In each country we find that respondents are much more likely to attribute their country’s increased military activities to defensive motivations and the increased military activities of the other country to offensive motivations. Audiences in both countries believe their side is acting defensively, and the other side is acting offensively. Interestingly, however, the magnitude of the attribution asymmetry is 3.1 times greater in China than the US, with the attribution asymmetry being 2.89 points ($p < 0.001$) among Chinese and 0.94 points ($p < 0.001$) among Americans on the seven point offensive-defensive attribution scale.

There are two interpretations of this differential attribution asymmetry. The first is that Chinese respondents are especially prone to security dilemma thinking in US-China relations; the second is that this asymmetry is due to the geographic proximity of the dispute, which makes American escalation mean something very different in China’s backyard than Chinese escalation does. We therefore fielded a follow-up study on a convenience sample of N=627 American adults recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk where we replicated the attribution module from our main study, but this time set the potential dispute in America’s backyard: maritime zones off the coast of Hawaii. Our interest is in how relocating the dispute to a location closer to home changes the attributions Americans make about the scenario.\textsuperscript{13}

To test how much of the difference in attribution asymmetries between the Chinese and Americans is due to the geographic features of the scenario, we compare the magnitude of the attribution asymmetries from the solid and dashed blue point estimates in Figure 2. The results show that when the dispute is relocated to the shores of Hawaii, Americans perceive Chinese escalation as significantly more offensively-motivated ($p < 0.001$) than they did when it was taking place in the South China Sea. However, even though relocating the dispute shrinks the magnitude of the gap between American and Chinese attribution asymmetries, it does not eliminate it: as a comparison between the solid red and dashed blue lines shows, the attribution asymmetry the Chinese provide in the first experiment remains 2.2 times larger than the attribution asymmetry the Americans provide in

\textsuperscript{13}Since the MTurk respondents differ from national population parameters in a variety of ways (Huff and Tingley, 2015), such that the sample differs in its demographic composition from the 2016 experiment, we use entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2012) to reweight the 2019 sample to match the demographic and partisan distributions of the 2019 sample. See Kertzer, Renshon and Yarbi-Milo (2018) for a similar approach. Unfortunately, changes in the Chinese political environment following the fielding of our first study meant we were unable to field the Hawaii version of the experiment in China.
the second. This shows that the higher levels of security dilemma thinking we detect in the Chinese sample are not merely an artifact of geographic proximity.

Importantly, comparing the solid and dashed blue point estimates also shows that although the magnitude of the attribution asymmetry Americans report is significantly larger in the Hawaii experiment than the China experiment \( t = -2.89, p < 0.004 \), the difference is due to changes in American attributions’ for Chinese behavior, rather than changes in self-attribution. Strikingly, Americans don’t see US escalation as significantly more defensively motivated in one context than the other \( (p < 0.223) \): that is to say, Americans perceive US escalation in China’s backyard as just as defensively motivated as when the US escalates close to American territory; Americans perceive American escalation to be defensively motivated regardless of where it’s located. That Americans appear to take the defensive nature of American escalation to be self-evident is a further illustration of the psychological microfoundations of security dilemma thinking at work.

Since geographic proximity appears to account for only 18% of the gap in attribution asymmetries between the US and Chinese samples in the first experiment,\(^\text{14}\) what other factors can explain why the Chinese respondents display significantly higher levels of security dilemma thinking? One possibility is that the divergent attributions our respondents make for each other’s behavior in a potential dispute reflect the differing understandings they have of the US-China relationship more broadly. As part of our dispositional questionnaire described in Appendix §3, we build off of work on image theory by including a set of items measuring the images that Americans and Chinese have of one another (Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995; Rathbun, 2015). As Figure 3 shows, Americans and Chinese understand the US-China relationship in fundamentally different ways. Chinese respondents are significantly more likely to view the United States as harboring threatening intentions than Americans indicate with respect to China \( (W = 827560, p < 0.001) \). And, citizens in the two countries also disagree on their relative power \( (W = 1604200, p < 0.001) \): Chinese respondents perceive China as significantly weaker than the United States, while Americans are more likely to perceive China as having already caught up.

Crucially, as Table 1 shows, these divergent perceptions between the two samples are significantly associated with within-sample variation in the magnitude of attribution asymmetry. In both the United States and China, respondents who perceive the other side as harboring more negative

\(^{14}\)If \( a_{i,j} \) denotes the attribution asymmetry for respondents from country \( i \) (either China, or the United States) in a dispute in context \( j \) (either the South China Sea, or Hawaii), the proportion of the differential attribution asymmetry we attribute to geographic proximity is calculated as \( \frac{(a_{c,scs} - a_{u,scs}) - (a_{c,haw} - a_{u,haw})}{a_{c,scs} - a_{u,scs}} \).
intentions in general also display significantly larger attribution asymmetries in the South China Sea dispute. We also find that respondents in both countries who see the two countries as closer together in power tend to perceive smaller attribution asymmetries, especially in China, where this effect is particularly large. In other words, the Chinese are especially prone to security dilemma thinking not just because the context where a potential dispute would most likely take place is located within its own backyard, but also because of the more threatening image they have of the US in general, which acts as a prism they use to interpret American behavior in specific instances, consistent with how images work in foreign policy more generally (Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995).

In aggregate, these findings suggest that in both countries, public opinion during a dispute in the region would more likely be an accelerator of a potential spiral model than an inhibitor against it. Regardless of where we conducted our study, both Americans and Chinese are prone to security dilemma thinking that could fan the flames of escalation. Our interest in the next experiment, then, is whether, consistent with prevailing wisdom in IR, perspective taking can mitigate these effects.
3.2 Perspective taking experiment

To examine the effects of perspective taking on escalation preferences, the vignette in the perspective taking experiment focuses respondents’ attention on the South China Sea and the security policies of the US and China. Our primary dependent variable is respondents’ preferred policy with regard to military escalation in the South China Sea. Higher values indicate respondents wanted their government to increase its military activities, while lower values indicate a preference for decreasing military activities. Since the dependent variable follows both the escalation (de-escalation) treatment and the perspective taking treatment in our experiment, Figure 4 presents the average policy preferences for respondents in each country, conditioning on treatment assignment.

As Figure 4 shows, and consistent with the results of the attribution module, the baseline preference of military escalation significantly differs between the Chinese and American publics. Chinese respondents are significantly more likely to support increasing their military activities in the South China Sea, with their average preferred policy scoring 1.07 \( (p < 0.001) \) points higher than their American counterparts.
Figure 4: Effects of treatments on policy preferences

Note: Higher values indicate more escalatory policy preferences. The figure shows that respondents in both countries are more supportive of escalation when the other side does the same, but that the Chinese public are consistently more supportive of escalation than the Americans are. Interestingly, the effect of the perspective taking (depicted here with p-values from t-tests) is highly contingent. Consistent with palliative accounts of perspective taking in IR, perspective taking makes Americans less escalatory when China does the same, facilitating positive reciprocity. However, for Chinese respondents the effect of perspective taking is inverted: when the United States de-escalates, the Chinese respond to the perspective taking treatment by favoring greater escalation, while when the United States escalates, the Chinese respond to the perspective taking treatment by favoring greater de-escalation.
than the US respondents on a seven-point scale. Regardless of treatment condition, the Chinese public prefers substantially higher levels of escalation in the South China Sea than their American counterparts, which is consistent with the conflict’s proximity and perceived threat for the Chinese.

We only briefly mention the effects of our escalation treatment, since it is of less theoretical interest. By comparing the left and right panels of Figure 4, we find that the public in both countries responds in a manner consistent with the spiral model of escalation that fuels the security dilemma. In both samples, respondents prefer higher levels of escalation by their own government after the other country escalates their military activities, with the average increase for the US and China being 0.50 and 0.59 respectively (both significant at $p < 0.001$). This pattern is not surprising, but shows that respondents are reacting in a coherent manner, consistent with existing theories of tit-for-tat escalation.

More important are the effects of our perspective taking treatment, which displays divergent effects on policy preferences in the US and China. In the US, the perspective taking treatment causes participants to advocate for de-escalation when the other side is observed decreasing their military activities ($-0.27, p < 0.018$). However, we find that the perspective taking treatment has the opposite effect among the Chinese public. After engaging in perspective taking and observing the US de-escalate its military activities, Chinese respondents prefer significantly higher levels of military activities ($0.23, p < 0.037$). This finding illustrates that perspective taking is not a panacea for alleviating the security dilemma, and instead encourages Chinese respondents to strategically seek to take advantage of their adversary’s de-escalation by moving to gain a decisive advantage in the conflict. Interestingly, the perspective taking treatment also has the effect of decreasing the hawkishness of the Chinese public’s preferred policy when the US has already escalated its military activities ($-0.23, p < 0.017$), suggesting that it makes the Chinese public more likely to be deterred from military escalation when the other side escalates, somewhat mitigating the preference for mutual tit-for-tat escalation. We therefore find that perspective taking causes the Chinese to be more likely to escalate when the US shows weakness, but more likely to de-escalate when the US shows strength.\footnote{Perspective-taking involves cognitive exertion, which means perspective-taking inherently involves rumination, which is a causal mechanism through which perspective-taking affects downstream attitudes or behavior. This point is worth emphasizing, since it suggests that divorcing perspective-taking from rumination entirely would be a form of post-treatment bias (King and Zeng, 2007). However, respondents in both the control and treatment may engage in varying levels of rumination, and so we assessed the extent to which rumination itself contributes to the effect.}

\footnote{Given potential non-compliance, in Appendix §4.1 we combine sensitivity analyses with an instrumental variable approach to estimate causal average complier effects, showing how the results presented in the main text are likely underestimating the effect of the treatment.}
To better understand the divergent effects of perspective taking across the US and Chinese samples – especially in the de-escalation condition, where the backfire effect in the Chinese sample is especially striking given the palliative effects assumptions that pervade IR scholarship — we turn to psychological research on the dark side of perspective taking, which suggests that negative effects are especially likely when actors perceive threats to their identity, and when actors perceive threats to their goals or interests. For each of these potential mechanisms, we adopt a two-pronged empirical strategy, in which we first test whether the US and Chinese samples differ from one another along a given dimension, and then test whether variation in that dimension can help explain within-sample variation in the effect of the perspective taking treatment.

While there are many mechanisms through which identity threats operate in IR (e.g. Mitzen, 2006; Rousseau, 2006), the most important is national attachment, reflecting the extent to which respondents identify with their country (Herrmann, Isernia and Segatti, 2009). More nationalist individuals are not only more likely to feel like being a member of their national ingroup is an important part of their identity, but to have a starker perception of shared fate (Brewer and Brown, 1998). As Herrmann (2017, S62) writes, “The more someone attaches his or her own identity to the nation, the more they will feel the possible threats to the nation” as a result. To measure respondents’ levels of nationalism, we measured national attachment in both our American and Chinese samples, described in Appendix §3. We find that Chinese respondents are significantly more nationalist than American respondents are ($t = 12.99, p < 0.001$), as shown in Figure 5(a) below.

In order for nationalism to explain the divergent effects of perspective taking between the two samples, however, it would need to moderate the effects of the perspective taking treatment. Yet we find weak evidence in support of nationalism’s moderation effect, as shown in Figure 5(b): although three of the effects shown here have the right sign — nationalist respondents engaged in perspective taking are more likely to want to escalate, and less nationalist respondents engaged in perspective taking are less likely to do so — the interaction effects aren’t statistically significant. Even though the Chinese respondents appear more nationalist than the American ones are, we don’t have strong evidence that identity threat can explain the differential effects of perspective taking between China and the US.

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of perspective taking. To do so, we use measures of response latency (Mulligan et al., 2003): that is, how long respondents spent when engaging with the scenario, under the assumption that respondents with higher response latencies engaged in more rumination than respondents with lower response latencies. As shown in Appendix §4.5 we do not find that response latency explains the effects of perspective taking, suggesting that the perspective taking treatment results in more than simply a rumination effect.
Panel a shows that the Chinese sample (in red) is more nationalist than the American sample (in blue). Panel b depicts the marginal effect of the perspective taking treatment at different levels of nationalism in all four treatment cells. While 3 of the 4 interaction effects have the right sign (in which perspective taking increases the likelihood of escalation among more nationalist respondents), the slopes are modest and the interaction effects are not statistically significant. Effects estimated using a kernel estimation procedure with k-fold least-squares cross-validation using the interflex package in R to avoid making functional form assumptions, and control for a range of demographic characteristics.
The second context where perspective taking can backfire is when actors vary in their perceptions of threats to their goals. In situations of positive goal interdependence, perspective taking can promote prosocial behavior towards the outgroup, but in situations of negative goal interdependence, perspective taking can heighten awareness of conflicts of interest (Okimoto and Wenzel, 2011; Mooijman and Stern, 2016), especially when the perceived capabilities of the other side are relatively high. As discussed earlier and shown in the left-hand side of Figure 3, Chinese respondents perceive greater threats to their interests from the United States than Americans perceive from China ($W = 827560, p < 0.001$). The important question is how these perceptions of negative intentions moderate the impact of perspective taking.

Figure 6: Testing the negative goal interdependence mechanism

![Figure 6](image)

Figure 3 showed that the Chinese sample perceives the US to harbor more negative intentions in general than the American sample perceives about China. Figure 6 depicts the marginal effect of the perspective taking treatment at different levels of perceived negative goal interdependence in each sample. Chinese respondents who perceive the United States as harboring more negative intentions are much less likely to back down in response to American escalation, while American respondents who perceive negative goal interdependence from the Chinese are less likely to engage in positive reciprocity when the Chinese de-escalate. Effects estimated using a kernel estimation procedure with k-fold least-squares cross-validation using the *interflex* package in R to avoid making functional form assumptions, and control for a range of demographic characteristics.

Figure 6 shows that perceived negative goal interdependence mitigates the palliative effects of perspective taking in both the US and Chinese samples: when Americans who attribute negative intentions to China more generally are asked to engage in perspective taking, they’re significantly less likely to reciprocate Chinese de-escalation ($p < 0.078$), while it’s only those Chinese who attribute more positive intentions to the United States more generally that respond to perspective taking by being much more likely to back down in response to American escalation ($p < 0.037$). We therefore
find stronger evidence in favor of the negative goal interdependence mechanism than we do for the identity threat mechanism.

Figure 7: Security dilemma thinking mitigates the palliative effects of perspective taking

![Figure 7](image)

Figure 7 depicts the marginal effect of the perspective taking treatment at different levels of security dilemma thinking. Chinese respondents who displayed the largest attribution asymmetries in the attribution experiment are much more likely to respond to perspective taking in the perspective taking experiment by wanting to escalate when the United States backs down, while American respondents who displayed the largest attribution asymmetries in the attribution experiment are much less likely to respond to perspective taking by wanting to de-escalate when China backs down. Effects estimated using a kernel estimation procedure with k-fold least-squares cross-validation using the `interflex` package in R to avoid making functional form assumptions, and control for a range of demographic characteristics.

Finally, we can exploit the fact that respondents completed both the attribution module and the perspective-taking module to tie the two experiments together. The attribution module shows that both American and Chinese respondents are prone to security-dilemma thinking, but also that its magnitude varies substantially across respondents in both countries. The perspective taking experiment shows that perspective taking can sometimes have a dark side in foreign policy crises, especially for actors who perceive threats to their identities and goals. If the conventional wisdom about the palliative effects of perspective taking is correct, perspective taking should mitigate the effects of security dilemma thinking, allowing individuals to break out of the security dilemma. Yet as Figure 7 shows, we find no evidence in support of this conventional wisdom. Rather than finding that perspective taking mitigates the effects of security dilemma thinking, Figure 7 shows that security dilemma thinking counteracts the palliative effects of perspective taking: in both the Chinese and US samples in the de-escalate condition, perspective taking only has palliative effects among respondents who are low in security dilemma thinking ($p < 0.004$ for China, $p < 0.007$ for US). High security dilemma thinking respondents are much more likely to respond to perspective
taking by wanting to escalate.\textsuperscript{17} These findings thus suggest an irony in advocating for perspective
taking as a solution to security dilemma thinking, since it appears to only have these palliative
effects among people who aren’t prone to security dilemma thinking in the first place.

3.2.1 Effects of perspective taking on policy reasoning

The above analysis shows that perspective taking does not necessarily have palliative effects: perspec-
tive taking induces reciprocity among American respondents — who are more likely to de-escalate
if the Chinese do the same — but not among our Chinese respondents, who seek to project strength
when the US de-escalates, but de-escalate in the face of American strength. Our previous analysis
suggested that one reason why perspective taking produces different results for each sample is be-
cause it activates different knowledge structures in each group, with Chinese respondents perceiving
greater threat from the US more generally than Americans perceive from the Chinese.

To further explore the content of these knowledge structures, we turn to the explanations re-
spondents gave for their preferred policy choice. We asked all respondents to explain their preferred
policy choice in a free response format. We analyze these open-ended responses using a structural
topic model (STM), a semiautomated text analysis model that allows us to measure the impact
of our perspective taking treatment on the language used by respondents. Thus, whereas the pre-
vious analysis asks how experimentally inducing perspective taking affects what respondents want
their countries to do, this analysis turns to discourse and asks how perspective taking affects why
respondents want their countries to behave in a particular way.

While the technical details of STMs are beyond the scope of this paper (see Roberts et al. (2014)
for an introduction), they can be thought of as an automated text analysis technique that models
text as a mixture of interpretable “topics.” An advantage of STMs are that they are unsupervised,
which means they “discover” topics in the text, rather than assuming their existence, which limits
the potential for the researcher’s prior expectations to influence the topics that are identified. Most
importantly for our analysis, unlike more traditional models used in text analysis, such as Latent
Dirichelet Allocation (LDA), STMs allow us to leverage information about respondents (in our case,
the treatment group to which they were randomly assigned) when structuring the topics, rather
than assuming that the topics and topical prevalence are constant across all respondents.

\textsuperscript{17}We operationalize low and high here based upon whether respondents display a positive attribution asymmetry
or not.
Figure 8: Structural topic model results: United States (China de-escalates condition)

Results from structural topic models, US sample. The left-hand panel displays the effect of the perspective taking treatment on the free responses provided by respondents justifying their policy recommendation; the effect estimates are measures of changes in topical prevalence. The right-hand panel displays representative responses.

We estimate a series of STMs on our respondents’ open-ended explanations for their policy choice, using the models to identify topics within the responses and, most importantly, to measure whether those topics systematically differ in prevalence across the perspective taking treatment and control groups.\textsuperscript{18} Due to space constraints, we focus our analysis on the most theoretically interesting part of the experiment highlighted above: the de-escalate condition, where perspective taking has divergent effects in both samples, leading to reciprocal de-escalation in the American sample, but increased escalation in the Chinese one; a similar analysis for the escalation condition can be found in Appendix §4.4.

For the American sample in Figure 8, we find that when China de-escalates, the perspective taking treatment results in greater usage of language emphasizing reciprocity. Consistent with the positive goal interdependence perceived by American respondents, respondents are much more likely to invoke language embracing reciprocal de-escalation, and do not view the Chinese presence as particularly threatening, with one respondent writing that the US should “respond positively to

\textsuperscript{18}For our US respondents, we pre-process the text using the \texttt{tm} package in R, whereas for our Chinese respondents, we use \texttt{Jieba}, a Python-based Chinese word segmentation module. Once the models have been estimated, we then interpret the English-language versions of the topics, as translated by three native Chinese speakers to ensure intercoder reliability.
China’s willingness to compromise” and another noting that since China decreased its presence the “US could show China’s equal gesture of decreasing naval presence”. Echoing the analysis above, these findings suggest that the perspective taking treatment makes it more likely that American respondents interpret China’s decrease in military activities as signaling willingness to compromise based on compatible goals, which leads them to explain their policy preferences in terms of reciprocal efforts to de-escalate the situation.

Figure 9 displays the STM results for our Chinese sample. It shows that the perspective taking treatment significantly affects Chinese participants’ policy explanations in two different ways. First, consistent with Chinese respondents’ perception of negative goal interdependence and threats to Chinese interests, it increases their emphasis on projecting strength and protecting their interests. One respondent wrote “China should not be too weak, it should strive for its own benefits”, while another writes they are “Not preparing for war, but to clearly state our position.” Such statements are significantly more likely in the perspective taking treatment for Chinese respondents, who perceive the US and China to have conflicting intentions and interests. Furthermore, one respondent writes, “China should be neither too weak nor too tough. They will think we are easily bullied if our gesture is too weak, and they will think we want to bully other smaller states if we present too strong a gesture. It is none of the U.S.’s business, they are just meddling around.” The moderate escalation Chinese respondents prefer when responding to a US de-escalation in the perspective taking condition reflects this logic. Second, and especially interestingly, asking participants to assess the conclusions the United States would draw leads them to be less likely to think about the strategic calculations of others in the region: participants in the control condition were significantly more likely to discuss the ramifications of China’s behavior on its neighboring countries (offering responses like “Increasing actions will lead to the distrust and suspicion among the neighboring countries, while reducing actions will undermine our control over this area. Thus, the better approach is to maintain the status quo.”). This is helpful in reminding us that although we think about perspective taking in a dyadic manner, in a regional context with multiple actors, investing cognitive resources in thinking about one actor’s perspective can crowd out the perspective of others.

In sum, perspective taking affects both what respondents want their countries to do, and why. Against the palliative effects hypothesis, however, its effects are not always positive, but contingent on perceived threats to actors’ interests. It makes American respondents, who perceive relatively little threat to their interests in the dispute, place a heavier emphasis on reciprocity. In contrast,
Figure 9: Structural topic model results: China (United States de-escalates condition)

Policy explanation (US de-escalates condition)

Project strength

Change in topical prevalence from control to PT

Neighboring countries

Representative responses:

The stronger China’s military presence in the South China Sea, the more military force will be deployed by the U.S. in the region, until China’s military power has become so strong that the increase of U.S. strength is no longer meaningful.

As China’s military deployment keeps increasing in the South China Sea, the U.S. will put more troops in this area. I am afraid that this is a persistent trend until China’s military strength became strong enough to counteract all of the U.S. deployment.

China should not be too weak, it should strive for its own benefits.

Not preparing for war, but to clearly state our position.

China should be neither too weak nor too tough. They will think we are easily bullied if our gesture is too weak, and they will think we want to bully other smaller states if we present too strong a gesture. It is none of the U.S.’s business, they are just meddling around.

Effect of perspective-taking treatment on topical prevalence:

Representative responses:

We should remain vigilant against the neighboring countries.

For now, the situation has not been entirely deteriorated, thus an increase of military operations could only antagonize the neighboring countries. On the other hand, reducing military actions would only harm our own interests. The top priority is to properly handle the North Korean issue in order to boost the confidence of neighboring countries in China’s longstanding neutrality. Otherwise, an increase in military operations would only force the Asia-Pacific countries to the side with the U.S. and Japan, since all of them have always believed that China is still secretly supporting North Korea.

Increasing too much and too fast can cause insecurity among neighboring countries and the United States, leading to the increase in their military presence in the South China Sea.

Increasing actions will lead to the distrust and suspicion among the neighboring countries, while reducing actions will undermine our control over this area. Thus, the better approach is to maintain the status quo.

Effect of perspective-taking treatment on topical prevalence:
it makes Chinese respondents, for whom a dispute in the South China Sea activates knowledge structures relating to threat, more interested in projecting strength when the US shows signs of weakness.

4 Conclusion

The rise of China has led to an outgrowth of interest in security dilemmas, and a surge of scholarship exploring the ways that tensions between the rising power and the United States can be mitigated. In this paper, we explore the role of perspective taking in this process. Given continued tensions in the South China Sea, and concerns about popular nationalism in both the American and Chinese publics, understanding how the perceptions held on both sides are formed — and how they are shaped by perspective taking — is a useful endeavor for both scholars and policymakers alike.

In our first set of cross-national experiments, we find micro-level evidence consistent with security dilemma thinking in both China and the United States: both Chinese and American respondents perceive the same action as defensively motivated when carried out by their own side, and offensively motivated when carried out by the other. We also show that the magnitude of security dilemma thinking is partly a function of individuals’ perceptions of the US-China relationship more generally, which differ quite dramatically between China and the United States.

These findings make a number of important contributions to the study of international security, political psychology, and public opinion in US-China relations. First, although political psychologists have long argued the security dilemma has psychological microfoundations, this is the first study to identify this attribution asymmetry experimentally, which we find evidence of in national samples in two different great powers. Security dilemma thinking is therefore not merely the preserve of elite decision-makers, but is also detectable in the public writ-large. Second, our findings shed new light on public opinion dynamics in the region, a crucial subject in an era when policymakers are increasingly concerned about the extent to which the mass public in both countries can function as an accelerant rather than an inhibitor of great power conflict. Against an older tradition in IR assuming that public opinion has inherently pacifying effects on foreign policy, we show here that if a crisis were to break out in the region, there would be a reservoir of support for escalation on the Chinese side. Yet Americans aren’t immune to security dilemma thinking either: Americans perceive US escalation to be defensively motivated no matter where it takes place, but perceive the
same acts by another country to be offensively motivated even when it takes place in that other country’s backyard. Third, the differential perceptions of this US-China relationship we report here have important implications for American foreign policy and debates about American hegemony. IR scholars and pundits in the US often talk about the United States as a uniquely benevolent hegemon, arguing that the fundamentally liberal character of the US means that American hegemony shouldn’t be seen as threatening by others (e.g. Kagan, 1998). Yet as both Figure 3 and the open-ended responses show, our Chinese respondents see the US as wanting to dominate, rather than to lead. Our results are therefore consistent with a dissenting realist tradition arguing that the accumulation of power in the hands of others can be threatening in and of itself: the stronger the Chinese perceive the United States to be, they more they assume that US escalation is offensively motivated.

In our second set of cross-national experiments, our findings add a cautionary note to the palliative effects of perspective taking hypothesis often adopted by IR scholars. IR scholars have tended to think about perspective taking’s effects in relatively liberal ways, consistent with a broader ethos in IR theory that presumes the existence of a natural harmony of interests, such that conflict is merely the result of misperceptions or bargaining failures (Kertzer, 2016, 41): if only actors are given more information, or decision-makers’ excesses can be constrained by liberal-minded publics, cooperation will be more likely to occur. Our findings push back against both claims. Perspective taking may reveal the existence of complimentary interests, but it can backfire and highlight conflicts of interest as well, particularly when actors perceive threats to their interests. Perspective taking makes Americans – who perceive less threat – more likely to recognize conciliatory signals and respond with reciprocal policies of de-escalation, but Chinese respondents have a very different reaction, causing them to seek to project strength and think less about the regional ramifications when the US de-escalates. Moreover, rather than perspective taking causing individuals to be better able to avoid security dilemma thinking, we find that perspective taking only has palliative effects among individuals not prone to security dilemma thinking in the first place.

In demonstrating that perspective taking in IR is not an unvarnished good, these findings suggest several avenues for future research. First, our focus here was on cognitive forms of perspective taking, rather than affective forms of perspective taking that emphasize feeling what others are feeling. Future work should test the differential effects between the two. Second, we largely side-step here the question of empathic accuracy: our analysis focuses on what happens when we encourage Chinese and Americans to step into each other’s shoes, rather than assess how competently they
do so. Future scholarship can benefit from investigating the accuracy of these second-order beliefs directly (Mildenberger and Tingley, 2019). Third, it is worth noting that our perspective taking treatment was deliberately content-free, seeking to induce perspective taking rather than priming participants to attribute particular beliefs to the other side. In this sense, the study differs from the content-specific perspective taking interventions sometimes used in studies seeking to reduce intergroup prejudice. Other work can benefit from employing alternate forms of perspective taking treatments, determining what proportion of the effects come from perspective taking itself rather than the informational primes. In this manner, by showing that perspective taking is a broader construct — and thus has more complex effects — than many IR scholars assume, this study points to a broader research agenda on the dynamics of perspective taking in international affairs.
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Perspective-Taking and the Security Dilemma:
Supplementary Appendix

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1 Note on survey partner

Political surveys are sensitive in China. This is especially the case for a national-level survey fielded across all provinces and capital municipalities of China; as Table 1 shows, the resulting sample skews closely to demographic targets (as does the US sample - see Table 2). Given the political conditions, our partner company would only agree to field our experiment on the condition of strict confidentiality. We persuaded our partner to make an exception for the review process; however, no identifying information can be revealed to others beyond this exception as the leakage may impact the company’s interests in China.

While political/social desirability bias can exist in any survey sample, the concern may be greater in China due to the political environment. To manage this concern, we opted for an Internet survey instead of a face-to-face or telephone survey. Researchers have shown that anonymous online surveys reduce desirability bias (Chang and Krosnick, 2010). Indeed, we found that respondents seem to be quite willing to disapprove of the government when it does something that goes against their individual preferences. For example, in a 2015 study, one of the co-authors found that the majority of respondents did not approve of a Chinese leader who had threatened to use force in a territorial dispute but subsequently did not. Of course, even if desirability bias exists in China, it does not make the results less useful. The results remain relevant because the same desirability bias also operates in the real world.

Table 1: Sample characteristics: Chinese sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>2010 National Census</th>
<th>2016 sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northeastern</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central &amp; Southern</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northwestern</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>≤ 19</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>≥ 50</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Han</td>
<td>91.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Sample characteristics: US sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Population Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-44</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 65</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school or less</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college/university</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College/university</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate/professional school</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2 Translation protocol for survey instrument

The survey instrument was first written in the English language. For our Chinese respondents, the instrument was translated into Chinese and pre-tested in multiple stages to ensure accuracy. First, a native Chinese speaker (C1) translated the English instrument into Chinese. Next, one of the co-authors (A1) vetted the translated text and produced the first pre-test version. Both C1 and A1 are effectively bilingual. The focus of the translation was accuracy of meaning instead of a literal word-to-word translation, which can cause meaning distortions when the translated words combine into sentence form. Subsequently, this survey version is tested separately with four other Chinese speakers (C2, C3, C4, C5). Their feedback was used by A1 to produce the second pre-test version. This version is pre-tested with a small sample of Chinese natives (NS) selected from each of the different regions of China to check if the questions were clear and natural to them. Unclear or awkward wordings (few were detected at this stage) were revised in the final translated version. Sample NS was monolingual and not aware of the study design. Finally, the Chinese-language survey was also pre-tested by four additional Chinese language speakers, one native and three bilingual, to flag any problematic or confusing language.

3 Survey instrument

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective-Taking Experiment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

\textit{Introduction}

The following questions are about China’s relations with other countries around the world.

Note: the instrumentation below is for the version of the study fielded in China, with the text also translated into English. In the United States version of the study, the instrumentation is identical, except all references to China are instead references to the United States, and vice versa (e.g. in the American version, respondents are told that China has decided to increase/decrease naval deployments, whereas in the Chinese version, respondents are told that the United States has decided to increase/decrease naval deployments.)

最近南海局势备受关注。区域内的许多国家宣称，他们在有争议的国际水域拥有权利，而这些水域
有许多自然资源、渔业资源和贸易航道。这些在近年来愈发剧烈的外交争端中极为关键。中国关注美国在该地区的强硬举措。

Recently there has been much attention over tensions in the South China Sea. Multiple countries in the region have claimed rights to disputed international waters, which are home to a wealth of natural resources, fisheries, and trade routes — all of which are at stake in the increasingly frequent diplomatic standoffs. China is concerned about the United States’ assertiveness in the region.

Writing Task I

假设，美国决定[增加/减少]在南海战略海域的海军部署。您认为，中国会从美国的行动中得出什么样的结论？

Suppose the U.S. has decided to [increase / decrease] naval deployments in strategic maritime zones in the South China Sea. In your view, what conclusion would China draw from the U.S.’s action? [Writing task I: Open-ended response]

Perspective-taking treatment

背景介绍:

- 南海近来局势紧张。
- 许多区域内国家主张对有争议的水域拥有权利。中国关注美国在区域内的强硬举措。
- 假设，美国决定[增加/减少]在南海战略海域的海军部署。

中国国内在讨论，是否应当改变中国在南海的军事存在。

您认为，若美国决定增加其在南海的军事行动，中国会从中得出什么样的结论？

Background:

- There has recently been tension in the South China Sea.
- Multiple countries in the region have claimed rights to disputed waters. China is concerned about the U.S.’s assertiveness in the region.
- Suppose the U.S. has decided to [increase / decrease] naval deployments in strategic maritime zones in the South China Sea.
There is a debate in China about whether China should change their military presence in the South China Sea.

If China were to increase its military activities in the South China Sea, in your view, what conclusion would the U.S. draw from China’s action? [Writing task II: Open-ended response]

*Policy choice*

中国国内在讨论，是否应当改变中国在南海的军事存在。
在这种情况下，您认为中国在南海的军事行动应当增加、减少，还是保持不变？
[增加/减少/保持不变]

There is a debate in China about whether China should change their military presence in the South China Sea.

In this scenario, do you think that China’s military activities around the South China Sea should increase, decrease, or be kept about the same? [Increase / decrease / kept about the same]

[If increase]
中国的军事行动应当增加很多，还是增加一些？
[增加很多/增加一些]

Should China’s military activities increase by a lot, or only somewhat? [Increase / decrease / kept about the same]

[If decrease]
中国的军事行动应当减少很多，还是减少一些？
[减少很多/减少一些]

Should China’s military activities decrease by a lot, or only somewhat? [Increase / decrease / kept about the same]

[If kept about the same]
您是倾向增加军事行动、倾向减少军事行动、还是不倾向任何一方？
[倾向增加/倾向减少/不倾向任何一方]

Do you lean toward increasing military activities, lean toward decreasing them, or don’t lean either way? [Increase / decrease / kept about the same]
For each of the following statements, please select the answer that most closely matches your own views.

- If China were to increase its military activities in the South China Sea, do you think it would be: [1 (purely for defensive reasons) – 7 (purely for offensive reasons)]

- If the U.S. were to increase its military activities in the South China Sea, do you think it would be: [1 (purely for defensive reasons) – 7 (purely for offensive reasons)]

For each of the following statements, please select the answer that most closely matches your own views.

- If China were to increase its military activities in the South China Sea, how do you think it would affect the possibility of Sino-American economic cooperation? [1 (more likely to cooperate) – 7 (less likely to cooperate)]
• If the U.S. were to increase its military activities in the South China Sea, how do you think it would affect the possibility of Sino-American economic cooperation? [1 (More likely to cooperate) – 7 (Less likely to cooperate)]

**Dispositional measure of perspective taking**

Respondents also completed a dispositional questionnaire alongside the usual battery of demographic characteristics. Most notably, the questionnaire included a dispositional measure of the propensity to engage in perspective taking: the perspective-taking sub-scale of the interpersonal reactivity index (IRI) from Davis (1983), a commonly-used cognitive measure of empathy in the psychological literature. Whereas the perspective-taking treatment experimentally encourages half of our participants to engage in perspective-taking, the perspective-taking scale measures perspective-taking as a trait, scoring participants based on the extent to which they agree with the following questions. To avoid downstream effects, these dispositional questions were randomly assigned in an order manipulation, such that some participants answered the questionnaire prior to the scenario, and others after.

• I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision.

• I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.

• Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.

**Nationalism and Image Measures**

We measure nationalism using a question that measures respondents’ level of attachment to their country. Specifically, we use an item from the national attachment scale of Herrmann, Isernia and Segatti (2009), which asks:¹

• When someone says something bad about the American people, how strongly do you feel it is as if they said something bad about you?

We measure respondents’ images of the the other country using two items. Respondents are prompted with “For each of the following statements, please select the answer that most closely matches your own views.” The first item measures perceived negative goal interdependence/threat perception, while the second measures perceptions of relative power capabilities.

¹The United States survey had a five-point response scale, while the Chinese survey had a four-point response scale. Higher values represent stronger national attachment.
• China/the United States wants to dominate the world.

• With regard to national power, China has caught up with the United States.

4 Supplementary analysis

4.1 Causal average complier effects

Table 3: Causal average complier effect (CACE) estimates, US sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \tau )</th>
<th>China de-escalates</th>
<th>China escalates</th>
<th>China de-escalates</th>
<th>China escalates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \tau )</td>
<td>Ratio estimator</td>
<td>2SLS estimate</td>
<td>Ratio estimator</td>
<td>2SLS estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.27 (-0.51, -0.05)</td>
<td>-0.06 (-0.29, 0.18)</td>
<td>-0.27 (-0.5, -0.05)</td>
<td>-0.06 (-0.29, 0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>-0.35 (-0.64, -0.06)</td>
<td>-0.07 (-0.36, 0.22)</td>
<td>-0.28 (-0.52, -0.05)</td>
<td>-0.06 (-0.3, 0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>-0.36 (0.07, -0.6)</td>
<td>-0.07 (-0.38, 0.23)</td>
<td>-0.25 (-0.5, -0.01)</td>
<td>-0.07 (-0.33, 0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>-0.39 (-0.72, -0.07)</td>
<td>-0.08 (-0.4, 0.24)</td>
<td>-0.26 (-0.53, 0)</td>
<td>-0.06 (-0.33, 0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>-0.42 (-0.77, -0.07)</td>
<td>-0.08 (-0.42, 0.26)</td>
<td>-0.28 (-0.56, -0.01)</td>
<td>-0.02 (-0.31, 0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>-0.43 (-0.8, -0.08)</td>
<td>-0.09 (-0.45, 0.27)</td>
<td>-0.33 (-0.62, -0.05)</td>
<td>-0.02 (-0.28, 0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>-0.47 (-0.86, -0.08)</td>
<td>-0.1 (-0.48, 0.29)</td>
<td>-0.38 (-0.69, -0.08)</td>
<td>0.01 (-0.31, 0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>-0.51 (-0.95, -0.09)</td>
<td>-0.1 (-0.52, 0.31)</td>
<td>-0.43 (-0.75, -0.1)</td>
<td>-0.06 (-0.4, 0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>-0.57 (-1.06, -0.1)</td>
<td>-0.11 (-0.56, 0.34)</td>
<td>-0.41 (-0.76, -0.06)</td>
<td>-0.09 (-0.45, 0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>-0.61 (-1.13, -0.11)</td>
<td>-0.12 (-0.62, 0.37)</td>
<td>-0.45 (-0.82, -0.08)</td>
<td>-0.03 (-0.4, 0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>-0.66 (-1.25, -0.12)</td>
<td>-0.13 (-0.67, 0.4)</td>
<td>-0.43 (-0.82, -0.04)</td>
<td>-0.13 (-0.53, 0.27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 presents CACE estimates, defining compliance at different percentile thresholds (\( \tau \)) of response length. The first two columns in each panel use the ratio estimator \( CACE = \frac{\text{ITT}}{\text{ITT}(\text{compliance})} \) with 95% bootstrapped CIs, while the next two results from a 2SLS model with 95% normal theory CIs. Note that at 0% non-compliance, the CACE estimates replicate the ATEs reported in the main text.

Table 4: Causal average complier effect (CACE) estimates, Chinese sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \tau )</th>
<th>US de-escalates</th>
<th>US escalates</th>
<th>US de-escalates</th>
<th>US escalates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \tau )</td>
<td>Ratio estimator</td>
<td>2SLS estimate</td>
<td>Ratio estimator</td>
<td>2SLS estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.23 (0.002, 0.44)</td>
<td>0.23 (0.01, 0.45)</td>
<td>-0.23 (-0.41, -0.04)</td>
<td>-0.23 (-0.42, -0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.24 (0.002, 0.45)</td>
<td>0.25 (0.03, 0.47)</td>
<td>-0.24 (-0.42, -0.04)</td>
<td>-0.18 (-0.38, 0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.24 (0.002, 0.45)</td>
<td>0.25 (0.03, 0.47)</td>
<td>-0.24 (-0.42, -0.04)</td>
<td>-0.18 (-0.38, 0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.25 (0.002, 0.48)</td>
<td>0.38 (0.14, 0.62)</td>
<td>-0.27 (-0.48, -0.05)</td>
<td>-0.04 (-0.26, 0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.25 (0.002, 0.48)</td>
<td>0.38 (0.14, 0.62)</td>
<td>-0.27 (-0.48, -0.05)</td>
<td>-0.04 (-0.26, 0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.28 (0.003, 0.54)</td>
<td>0.46 (0.19, 0.72)</td>
<td>-0.3 (-0.55, 0.06)</td>
<td>0.12 (-0.13, 0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.31 (0.003, 0.59)</td>
<td>0.52 (0.24, 0.81)</td>
<td>-0.34 (-0.61, 0.06)</td>
<td>0.14 (-0.12, 0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.32 (0.003, 0.61)</td>
<td>0.56 (0.27, 0.85)</td>
<td>-0.35 (-0.63, -0.07)</td>
<td>0.08 (-0.2, 0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.36 (0.003, 0.68)</td>
<td>0.47 (0.16, 0.79)</td>
<td>-0.38 (-0.69, -0.07)</td>
<td>0.05 (-0.24, 0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.39 (0.004, 0.74)</td>
<td>0.41 (0.07, 0.74)</td>
<td>-0.42 (-0.76, -0.08)</td>
<td>0.04 (-0.27, 0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.43 (0.004, 0.82)</td>
<td>0.35 (0, 0.71)</td>
<td>-0.49 (-0.89, -0.09)</td>
<td>0.05 (-0.3, 0.39)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 presents CACE estimates, defining compliance at different percentile thresholds (\( \tau \)) of response length. The first two columns in each panel use the ratio estimator \( CACE = \frac{\text{ITT}}{\text{ITT}(\text{compliance})} \) with 95% bootstrapped CIs, while the next two results from a 2SLS model with 95% normal theory CIs. Note that at 0% non-compliance, the CACE estimates replicate the ATEs reported in the main text.
A potential concern when evaluating the effects of perspective-taking is that our experiment is akin to an encouragement design: participants are asked to think through and write out what conclusions the other country would draw from a particular foreign policy behavior. As with any encouragement design, then, it is important to address potential concerns about non-compliance: most notably, some participants in the treatment condition, who are encouraged to engage in perspective-taking may not take the exercise seriously and refuse to engage in it; in a potential outcomes framework, these would be the “never takers.” An examination of the contents of the second writing task suggest clear evidence that some participants did not comply with the treatment, writing responses in the US survey like “Balls”, “Merica” or “no comment”.

To explore the implications of non-compliance for our interpretation of the experimental results, we combine an instrumental variables approach with sensitivity analyses. First, we calculated the causal average complier effects (CACE) using the Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) ratio estimator, in which the CACE is the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect divided by the proportion of compliers in the treatment condition. To avoid making subjective coding decisions about the types of responses that count as complying, we define compliance using a sensitivity analysis approach, defining compliance thresholds at different percentiles of response length to the second writing task completed by participants in the perspective-taking treatment, under the assumption that respondents who wrote longer responses are more likely to have complied with the treatment. We calculate response length in the US survey by simply calculating the number of characters of the free response; for the Chinese survey we first pre-process the free-responses using Jieba, a Python-based Chinese word segmentation module. The ratio estimator results are presented in the first two columns in each panel in Table 3 for the US survey, and in Table 4 for the Chinese survey, with 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. We also estimate the CACE using a more formal 2-stage least squares (2SLS) approach, instrumenting for compliance with the treatment using random assignment to the perspective-taking treatment (Gerber and Green, 2012); these results are shown in the third and fourth columns in each panel of each table, with 95% normal theory confidence intervals.

Despite the crudeness of our indicators of compliance, we find results largely consistent with our theoretical story. In the US survey, as the response-length cutoff for defining compliance with the perspective-taking treatment increases, the effect estimates for respondents exposed to the China de-escalate treatment becomes larger, meaning those who complied with the treatment were more likely to prefer de-escalatory policies. Similarly, in the Chinese survey, as the response-length cutoff
for defining compliance with the perspective-taking treatment increases, the effect estimate for respondents exposed to the US de-escalation treatment becomes larger, as is the case with the ratio estimator for respondents exposed to the US escalation treatment. Noncompliance thus makes the ATE results reported in the main text conservative estimates. Importantly, the estimates in Tables 3-4 assume one-sided noncompliance. It is also possible for there to be two-sided noncompliance, in that some participants in the control condition may already be in engaged in perspective-taking regardless of treatment assignment; in a potential outcomes framework, these would be “always takers”. However, in this case the ratio estimator provides a lower bound on the effect, since non-compliance in the control group decreases the size of the compliance group (reflected in the denominator), increasing the estimated CACE, such that the results presented here remain conservative tests.

The potential for some respondents to engage in perspective taking, even when they are in the control condition deserves further attention. In a potential outcomes framework, these would be the “always takers.” Indeed, we do find some evidence of perspective taking in the control condition, but not in the same manner induced by the treatment condition. The STM results in section 3.2.1 of the paper show that Chinese respondents in the US de-escalates condition are less likely to think about the strategic calculations of neighboring countries once they are asked to engage in perspective taking. For our purposes, this highlights that some people will engage in perspective taking on their own, but that it is not always in a dyadic framework. Additionally, the effect of having “always takers” suggests that our findings are a conservative estimate of the effect of perspective taking.

4.2 Balance tests

Figures 1 and 2 show that randomization was successful, in that respondents in both the Chinese and the US experiments are well-balanced across treatment conditions for a wide range of demographic characteristics.
Figure 1: Balance tests: China experiment

- **Age**
- **Gender**
- **Han ethnicity**
- **Household income**
- **University degree**
- **Party affiliation**
- **Interest in politics**
- **Marital status**
- **Knowledge**
Figure 2: Balance tests: US experiment

- **Age**: Density plots for Treatment 0 and Treatment PT for age distribution.
- **Gender**: Density plots for Treatment 0 and Treatment PT for gender distribution.
- **Party ID**: Density plots for Treatment 0 and Treatment PT for party identification.
- **Household income**: Density plots for Treatment 0 and Treatment PT for household income.
- **Race**: Density plots for Treatment 0 and Treatment PT for race distribution.

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4.3 Exploiting natural variation in perspective-taking motivation

Although IR scholars tend to view perspective taking as having powerful palliative effects, it is worth noting that many of us aren’t very good at perspective taking.\(^2\) Many of the psychological biases depicted by models of bounded rationality show how poorly we tend to engage in perspective taking. Attribution biases, for example, are biases in person perception (Ross, 1977), ingroup disconfirmation biases mean we reject schema-inconsistent information about others (Larson, 1994), ethnocentric biases mean we differentially treat members of ingroups and outgroups (Kinder and Kam, 2010), and anchoring and adjustment biases mean that when most of us try to imagine how others feel in a given situation, we do so by imagining how we would feel in that situation, and then adjust outwards—usually insufficiently (Epley et al., 2004).

The results from the paper only look at the effect of perspective-taking when it is experimentally induced, but we also know that perspective-taking is an individual difference; it is a faculty that some respondents are naturally better at employing than others (Davis, 1983; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004; Wakabayashi et al., 2006; Konrath, O’Brien and Hsing, 2011). We examine how this natural variation in propensity to engage in perspective-taking is associated with escalation preferences, while also acknowledging that these results should be approached with caution given recent questions raised by Murphy and Lilienfeld (2019) about the validity of the self-reported measures of cognitive perspective-taking. Does perspective-taking have palliative effects when studied dispositionally, rather than induced experimentally? The top half of Table 5 presents results from a series of regression models in the US sample, and the bottom half for the China sample, both of which estimate the effect of dispositional levels of perspective-taking controlling for the perspective-taking treatment and a variety of dispositional variables.

For the US sample when China de-escalates, dispositional perspective-taking has a negative sign as shown in models 1, 2, and 3 of Table 5. Although none reaches significance, the negative sign is consistent with the experimental effects, in which US respondents in the PT treatment are more likely to reciprocate de-escalation with de-escalation. Similarly, we find that the one significant effect of dispositional perspective-taking in the US sample is when China escalates, which once again mirrors the experimental results, whereby the US respondents in the PT treatment were more likely to reciprocate escalation with escalation. Thus, although the significance of the results varies, the

\(^2\)While some political scientists argue that leaders are more strategically skilled — and thus, presumably, better at perspective taking — than ordinary citizens, the psychological literature finds that individuals in positions of power are actually worse at perspective-taking (Galinsky et al., 2006)
Table 5: The dispositional perspective-taking results offer little support for the palliative effects of perspective-taking hypothesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample: US</th>
<th>China de-escalates</th>
<th>China escalates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispositional empathy</td>
<td>-0.201 (0.298)</td>
<td>-0.087 (0.278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspective taking</td>
<td>-0.268** (0.116)</td>
<td>-0.204* (0.107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military assertiveness</td>
<td>2.473*** (0.309)</td>
<td>2.473*** (0.309)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National chauvinism</td>
<td>0.786*** (0.213)</td>
<td>0.786*** (0.213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.146 (0.217)</td>
<td>0.146 (0.217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.273** (0.109)</td>
<td>0.273** (0.109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>0.073 (0.220)</td>
<td>0.073 (0.221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispositional empathy x PT</td>
<td>0.009 (0.553)</td>
<td>-1.561*** (0.552)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.518*** (0.234)</td>
<td>2.432*** (0.296)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample: China</th>
<th>US de-escalates</th>
<th>US escalates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispositional Empathy</td>
<td>0.422 (0.317)</td>
<td>-0.185 (0.311)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspective-taking</td>
<td>0.248** (0.111)</td>
<td>0.216** (0.106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military assertiveness</td>
<td>2.129*** (0.307)</td>
<td>2.109*** (0.308)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National chauvinism</td>
<td>0.403* (0.206)</td>
<td>0.409** (0.206)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.447 (0.360)</td>
<td>0.446 (0.360)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.081 (0.108)</td>
<td>0.082 (0.108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Member</td>
<td>0.350*** (0.119)</td>
<td>0.349*** (0.119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispositional empathy x PT</td>
<td>0.006 (0.607)</td>
<td>-0.672 (0.607)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.865*** (0.237)</td>
<td>3.111*** (0.354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
general direction of the effects of experimentally induced and dispositional perspective-taking are consistent.

The dispositional results also shed light on one of our experimental findings. In the paper, we found that the perspective-taking treatment did not have a significant effect in the US sample in the experimental condition where the other side escalates. The significant negative interaction term in model 6 of Table 5 suggests an interesting explanation for this effect. Substantively, the perspective-taking treatment has no significant effect on policy preferences among those respondents who are naturally predisposed to engage in perspective-taking, but a strong positive effect among respondents who are dispositionally low in perspective-taking. When the other side escalates, only those Americans least prone to engage in perspective-taking naturally need to be encouraged to do so. This is consistent with Galinsky et al. (2006), who find that power and perspective-taking are negatively correlated: when the US is in a position of relative strength in the region, respondents are less likely to naturally engage in perspective-taking unless encouraged to do so, whereas when the tables turn, only the least empathetic respondents need to be encouraged to engage in perspective-taking. Moreover, the sign of the effect is consistent with the reciprocity pattern reported in the US results above, since for those low-perspective-taking respondents for whom the treatment has a significant effect, the effect is positive, mirroring Chinese behavior.

Next we consider the results for Chinese respondents and find that dispositional perspective-taking is positively signed when the US de-escalates, as is shown in models 1, 2, and 3 of Table 5. The positive sign, although not significant, is consistent with the experimental findings, where Chinese respondents in the perspective-taking treatment were more likely to respond to de-escalation with escalation. This means that in three of the four experimental settings the general effects of dispositional perspective-taking are in the same direction as the effects of the experimental perspective-taking treatment. However, in the fourth combination, which is the Chinese sample when the US escalates, the effect of dispositional perspective-taking diverges from the effect of the experimental perspective-taking treatment. In this case, dispositional perspective-taking is positively signed, whereas the PT treatment had a negative effect. While this one difference may be concerning, it is not robust to controlling for threat perception or once the interaction effect of the perspective-taking treatment and dispositional perspective-taking is included.
4.4 Structural topic model results in the escalation conditions

The results in the main text present the STM results for China and the United States when the other side de-escalates, which is the most theoretically interesting pairing because it sheds light on the mechanisms driving the diverging effects of perspective taking between the two samples. However, we also estimated STM results for the Chinese and American samples when the other side escalates. Figure 3 presents the results in the American sample when China escalates, showing that even though China is escalating, the perspective taking treatment nonetheless causes respondents to perceive greater positive goal interdependence with China. The perspective taking treatment is associated with a significant decrease in language emphasizing Americans’ perceived threat and concern for protecting other countries. Encouraging our American respondents to take the perspective of the other side appears to make them less likely to perceive Chinese actions as threatening, which reduces the likelihood that people believe we need to protect ourselves or others from Chinese actions. Importantly, the STM recovers a significant decrease in this topic in the PT condition even though the PT treatment does not display a significant treatment effect on policy preferences. This pattern is likely due to what the causal inference literature refers to as an “inconsistent mediation effect”, in which a treatment affects multiple mechanisms of different sign, such that they cancel one another out, producing a non-significant total effect (MacKinnon, Krull and Lockwood, 2000). This would be the case if the perspective taking treatment decreases threat perception in the face of escalation, while also increasing other factors that have countervailing effects on policy preferences.

In the escalation condition in Figure 4, we find that the perspective taking treatment significantly affects Chinese participants’ policy explanations along three different dimensions. First, the perspective taking treatment decreases the extent to which participants emphasize increased military action. When faced with US escalation, respondents in the perspective taking treatment are less hawkish than respondents in the control (and thus less likely to offer statements like “The military has no field experience, and military operations could help to enhance its combat capability”, or “The situation in the South China Sea is getting serious, China is facing too many opponents in this case, thus it needs to rapidly increase its military strength and actions.”) Second, respondents in the perspective taking treatment are less likely to offer nationalist arguments emphasizing the inviolability of Chinese sovereignty, and thus less likely to make claims like “China shall not lose any one inch of the territory, and whoever sells any bit of the territory in exchange for a moment of
peace is the sinner of the Chinese nation and history", or “The Chinese have been silent for too long, and we will go to war for the country and national dignity!” Finally, respondents in the perspective taking condition are more likely to mention Chinese intrinsic interests, repeatedly mentioning the extent to which the conflict is taking place at China’s “front door", or invoking its maritime interests in the region. This suggests that one reason why Chinese respondents de-escalate in the perspective taking condition when faced with US escalation is because perspective taking causes them to perceive Chinese interests as sufficiently and self-evidently high that such costly signals are unnecessary.
Figure 4: Structural topic model results: China (United States escalates condition)

Policy explanation (US escalates condition)

Increase military actions

Representative responses:

- The situation at the South China Sea is getting serious, China is facing too many opponents in this case, thus it needs to rapidly increase its military strength and actions.
- The military now has no field experience, and military operations could help to enhance its combat capability.
- China should increase military actions to show our country's comprehensive national strength and military strength and put pressures on the United States and other countries.
- For now, some increase in military operations could protect our national interests.
- China always stands for peace and insists on peaceful foreign policies, but certain increase in military operations is conducive to maintaining China's majesty and a peaceful environment.

National sovereignty

Representative responses:

- The Chinese nation is a benevolent nation, but it does not mean that our tolerance is unlimited! We always use force only after showing our courtesy, but it does not imply that we will remain silent even if you are bullying us. Our people have an unyielding spirit, with strong determination. Any country which intervenes the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China will be taken down no matter how far it is from. The Chinese have been silent for too long, and we will go to war for the country and national dignity!
- China shall not lose any one inch of the territory, and whoever sells any bit of the territory in exchange for a moment of peace is the sinner of the Chinese nation and history.
- Defend the national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- The threats cannot be resisted if there is not enough military force to counter such threat.

Chinese intrinsic interests

Representative responses:

- No wonder that the U.S. will come all the way over to fight for their so-called “interests” in the region when China is not even able to defend its South China Sea which is its home door.
- Natural and fishery resources.
- Right at the front door.
- China has restrained itself to its utmost in the South China Sea maritime rights disputes. Even though individual southeast Asian countries (the Philippines, Vietnam) have recurrently, illegally occupied China’s reefs in the south China sea and natural resources in a large-scale, China still suggests peacefully solving the problems rather than resorting to force.

Effect of perspective-taking treatment on topical prevalence:

Results from structural topic models, China sample (US escalates condition). The top-left panel displays the effect of the perspective taking treatment on the free responses provided by respondents justifying their policy recommendation; the effect estimates are measures of changes in topical prevalence. The remaining panels display representative responses for each topic, translated into English.
4.5 Rumination Effects

To test whether a rumination effect is a leading mechanism underpinning the effect of perspective taking, we proxy for rumination using response latency (Mulligan et al., 2003): that is, how long respondents spent when engaging with the scenario, under the assumption that respondents with higher response latencies engaged in more rumination than respondents with lower response latencies. We therefore calculate respondents’ response time for the screen of the study where respondents were shown the scenario, and administered the two dependent variables of interest (their policy preferences, and their open-ended response justifying their policy choice).

If perspective-taking is simply akin to rumination, it should be the case that respondents who did not receive the perspective-taking treatment, but who display a long (e.g. slow) response latency, should express policy preferences more similar to respondents who did receive the perspective-taking treatment. We therefore calculate the natural log of respondents’ response time on the screen, to account for outliers, and regress respondents’ policy preferences on their logged response times, among those respondents who were given the perspective-taking control. We do so for each of the three escalation conditions (China de-escalates in the US sample, US de-escalates in the Chinese sample, US escalates in the Chinese sample) where the perspective taking treatment has a statistically significant effect.

In the US sample, in the China de-escalates condition, the effect of response time ($B = -0.07$ in a bivariate model, $B = -0.01$ in a multivariate model also controlling for basic demographic characteristics) is not statistically significant ($p < 0.35$; $p < 0.91$).

In the Chinese sample, in the US de-escalates condition, the effect of response time ($B = -0.31$ in a bivariate model, $B = -0.29$ in a multivariate model also controlling for basic demographic characteristics), is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$, $p < 0.02$), but the sign is in the wrong direction: that is, whereas the perspective taking treatment makes Chinese respondents more likely to want to escalate in the US de-escalates condition, respondents with higher response latencies in the control condition are more likely to want to de-escalate. As before, then, respondents in the perspective-taking control engaged in more rumination are not more likely to resemble respondents in the perspective taking condition.

In the Chinese sample, in the US escalates condition, the effect of response time ($B = -0.15$ in both a bivariate model and a multivariate model also controlling for basic demographic char-
acteristics), is statistically significant ($p < 0.09, p < 0.08$) and in the right direction, in that like the perspective taking treatment in the US escalates condition, respondents with higher response latencies are more likely to want to de-escalate. However, the fact that response latency has a similar effect in the US de-escalates condition as in the US-escalates condition suggests that this pattern is due to a general association between response latencies and hawkish escalatory preferences in the Chinese sample; indeed, once we control for respondents’ levels of hawkishness, the effect here is no longer statistically significant.

Together, then, this analysis suggests that the perspective taking treatment is more than simply a rumination effect.
References


