Susanna Claire Siegel

Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy

Department of Philosophy

Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138

 

Employment

June 2017: Visiting Professor of Philosophy. École Normale Supérieure, Paris.

January 2011-present: Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University.

January 2013-2016: Professor II, CSMN. Oslo, Norway.

January 2014-2016: Distinguished Visiting Research Professor, University of Birmingham.

2011-2012: Walter Channing Cabot Fellow, Harvard University.

December 2005-December 2010: Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University.

July 2004-December 2005: Associate Professor of Philosophy and John L. Loeb Associate Professor of the Humanities, Harvard University.

July 1999-June 2004: Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University.

 

Education

September 1993 - May 1999: Cornell University, Ph.D. Philosophy, January 2000.

Dissertation: Perception and Demonstrative Reference

 

Awards and Grants

Š        2015-2016. Director, NEH Summer Institute (with Nico Silins). Presupposition and Perception: Reasoning, Ethics, Politics, Aesthetics. Cornell University.

Š        2014-15. NSF Grant for Conference on Bayesian Theories of Perception and Epistemology.

Š        2011-2014. Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Partnership Development Grant. The Senses. PI: Mohan Matthen, University Toronto. Partners: Fiona Macpherson (Glasgow), Alex Byrne (MIT), Barry Smith (London Institute of Philosophy).

Š        2012-14, Co-Investigator, Belief and Mental Agency (Josefa Toribio, PI, University of Barcelona) MCINN Grant from the government of Spain.

Š        2012 Walter Channing Cabot Fellow. Prize for The Contents of Visual Experience.

Š        2012-13. Mind, Brain and Behavior Faculty Award, for Postdoc Fellow (Eric Mandelbaum).

Š        2010-11. Radcliffe Exploratory Workshop: Prediction, Goals, and Stereotypes in Perception.

Š        2010-2012. Mind, Brian and Behavior Faculty Award, for Postdoc Fellow (Sebastian Watzl).

Š        2007-2009. Australian Research Council Grant, with David Chalmers and Ned Block."High-level Contents of Consciousness".

 

Named Lectureships

2008. The Burman Lectures, Umea, Sweden.

2012. The Gareth Evans Memorial Lecture, Oxford.

2013. Tamara Horowitz Memorial Lecture. University of Pittsburgh.

2015. President’s Invited Lecture, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology.

2016. Mesthene Lecture, Rutgers University.

2016. Gustav Bergmann Lecture, University of Iowa.

2016. Gail Stine Memorial Lecture. Wayne State University.

2017. Visiting Professor of Philosophy, École Normale Supérieure. Paris

 

Public Presentations

2017: Talk at Harvard Bookstore on The Rationality of Perception. Ethics in the World series. Available for viewing at WGBH Forum.

 

Interviews

2013: 3am magazine (“Phenomenology Never Goes out of Date”).

2017: Philosofuj magainze (in Polish)

 

Monographs

The Contents of Visual Experience. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010.

(Winner of 2012 Walter Channing Cabot Fellow Prize).

The Rationality of Perception. Oxford University Press. Oxford University Press 2017.

 

 

Articles

Š “Inference without Reckoning”. Forthcoming in M. Balcerak-Jackson and B. Balcerak-Jackson, eds. Reasoning: Essays in Practical and Theoretical Thinking. Oxford University Press.2018.

Š The Structure of Episodic Memory: Ganeri's 'Mental Time Travel and Attention'. with Nicholas Silins. Forthcoming in the Australasian Philosophical Review. 2018.

Š “Rich or Thin?” Debate with Alex Byrne about the contents of perception. In Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Perception. Ed. B. Nanay. Routledge. 2016.

Š “Epistemic Charge” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 2016.

Š “How is Wishful Seeing like Wishful Thinking?” In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2016.

Š “Epistemic Evaluability and Perceptual Farce” In J. Zeimbekis and A. Raftopoulos. New Essays in Cognitive Penetration. Oxford University Press. 2015.

Š “Cognitive Penetrability: Modularity, Epistemology, and Ethics” with Zoe Jenkin. Review of Psychology and Philosophy. 2015.

Š “Affordances and the Content of Perception”. In Does Perception Have Content? Ed. B. Brogaard. Oxford University Press. 2015.

Š “Consciousness, Attention, and Perceptual Justification” (with Nicholas Silins), in Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, eds. D. Dodd and E. Zardini, Oxford University Press. 2014.

Š “Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?" In Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 4. Edited by T. Gendler. 2013.

Š “The Epistemic Impact of Etiology of Experience. Symposium in Philosophical Studies 162: 697-722. With comments by Michael Huemer, Matthew McGrath, and Richard Fumerton. 2013.

Š “Are there Edenic Grounds of Perceptual Intentionality?” Analysis Reviews 2013.

Š “The Epistemology of Perception” (with Nicholas Silins), in Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception (ed. M. Matthen). 2013.

Š Symposium on The Contents of Visual Experience with Précis and replies to symposiasts: John Campbell, Jesse Prinz, Charles Travis. Philosophical Studies 2013.

Š “The Visual Experience of Causation” Philosophical Quarterly. 2009.

Š “The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination” in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (eds. A. Haddock and F. Macpherson). Oxford University Press, 2008.

Š “How can we discover the contents of experience?” Southern Journal of Philosophy 2007.

Š “Do we see more than we can access?” with Alex Byrne and David Hilbert. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 2007.

Š “Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience.” The Philosophical Review, vol. 115 no. 3 (July 2006), pp. 355-388.

Š “How does Visual Phenomenology Constrain Object-seeing?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2006.

Š “Direct Realism and Perceptual Consciousness” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2006.

Š “Pressupposition and Policing in Complex Demonstratives” with Michael Glanzberg. Nous. 2006.

Š “Which Properties are represented in perception?” Perceptual Experience. Eds. T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne. Oxford. 2006.

Š “The Phenomeonlogy of Efficacy” Philosophical Topics. 2005.

Š “Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal” Philosophical Studies. 2004.

Š “The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference” Philosophers’ Imprint. 2002.

Š Entry on The Contents of Perception, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

 

Critical discussions

Š        Workshop on the Perception and Reasoning in the work of Susanna Siegel, University of Tübingen, April 2015.

Š        Critical notice on The Contents of Visual Experience. “Presentation and Content”. John Bengson, Nous. 2014.

Š        Book Symposium on The Contents of Visual Experience. Critics: John Campbell, Jesse Prinz, Charles Travis. Philosophical Studies. 2013.

Š        Symposium on “The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience” Philosophical Studies. Contributions from Richard Fumerton, Michael Huemer, Matt McGrath. 2013.

Š        Author meets Critics session on The Contents of Visual Experience. Critics: Susanna Schellenberg, Kathrin Glüer, John Bengson. Central APA. February 2012.

Š        Author meets Critics session on The Contents of Visual Experience. Critics: Ned Block, John Campbell, Fred Dretske. Pacific APA. March 2012.

Š        Reading groups on manuscript of The Rationality of Perception at University of Michigan, University of California/San Diego, University of Wisconsin/Madison.

Š        Symposium on The Rationality of Perception. Critics: Jennifer Nagel, Adam Pautz, Peter Railton. Eastern APA. January 2018.

Š        Author meets Critics session on The Rationality of Perception. Critics: Andy Clark, Sally Haslanger, Christopher Peacocke. Pacific APA. March 2018.

Š        Book Symposia on The Rationality of Perception Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research and Analysis Reviews.

 

 

Editing and Refereeing

Associate Editor, Nous.

Philosophy of Mind Editor, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Philosophy of perception editor, Philpapers.org

Guest Editor of Special Issue of Inquiry on Belief, 2014.

Guest Editor with Zoe Jenkin of Special Issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology

on Cognitive Penetrability. 2015.

Philosophy of Mind Editor of Thought, 2012-2014.

Editorial Board, Journal of the American Philosophical Association.

 

 

Professional Service – Conferences and Workshops

•Organizer. with Adriana Renero. Workshop on Introspection. Mexico City 2017.

•Organizer. with Anya Farrenikova. Workshop on Probability and Perception. Held at UC Berkeley. 2017.

•Directors. with Nico Silins. NEH Summer Institute on Presupposition and Perception. Held at Cornell. 2016.

•Organizer. Workshop on Accountability for Attitudes. Harvard, 2016.

•Organizer, with Michael Brownstein. Workshop. Can Psychology Improve Policing? Harvard 2016. Edmund J. Safra Center for Ethics.

•Organizer. Workshop on Bayesian theories of perception and epistemology. Funded by NSF Grant. Held at Cornell University, July 2015.

•Organizer. Workshop on Norms of Inquiry. with Jane Friedman. NYU. 2015.

•Organizer. Workshop on Affect and Politics. Speakers: Amia Srinivasan, Kristie Dotson, Eric Mandelbaum, Susanna Siegel. Cornell University Society for the Humanities. February 2015.

•Organizer. Workshops for Philosophy in Spanish/Taller de Filosofía en EspaĖol.

            2016: Departamento de Filosofía, Harvard

2015: Departamento de Filosofía, Harvard

2014: Diálogo Sobre Filosofía en EspaĖol. Observatorio de la lengua espaĖola y las culturas hispánicas en los Estados Unidos

•Organizer. Workshop on Bayesian theories of Perception. Cornell University. August 2015.

•Organizer. Annual Workshop on Perception. A one-day workshop for young philosophers of mind. Sponsored by Provostial Fund for Arts and Sciences.

2012: Belief (Jane Friedman, Maria Aarnio, Lisa Bortolotti

2010: Time and the Unity of Consciousness (Matt Nudds, Adam Pautz, Philippe Chuard, Ian Philips)

2009: Perception Beyond Vision (Mark Green, Casey O'Callaghan,Frederique de Vignemont, Matt Fulkerson)

2008: Consciousness and Thought (Imogen Dickie, Declan Smithies, Matt Soteriou, Cheryl Chen)

2007: Proprioception and Bodily Awareness (Barbara Montero, Brian O'Shaughnessy, Jose Luis Bermudez)

2006: Perception: Fundamental Questions (Maja Spener, Chris Mole, Austen Clark)

 

•Organizer. Workshop on the Epistemology of Cognitive Penetrability. 2013 Harvard University.

•Organizer. Mind and Attention in Indian Philosophy. with Parimal Patil and Sebastian Watzl. 2013, Harvard University.

•Organizer. Imperatival Aspects of Perception. with Sebastian Watzl. Sponsored by CSMN. 2013, Oslo.

•Organizer. Workshop on Cognitive Penetration. with Nico Silins.

•Organizer. Philosophical Progress, with Daniel Stoljar, sponsored by the Harvard-Australia Research Grant. September 2011, Harvard University.

•Organizer. Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness, with David Bennett and the Network for Sensory Research. November 2011, Brown University.

•Organizer. Workshop on Cognitive Penetration. with Nico Silins. Cornell University, September 2010.

•Organizer. Radcliffe Exploratory Seminar. with Moshe Bar. Harvard University, Spring 2011.

•Organizer. Annual Symposia for Juniors in Mind, Brain and Behavior.

2011: Social Vision (Keith Payne, Lisa Barrett, Brian Scholl)

2010: Concepts and Conceptualization (Susan Carey, Bernhard Nickel, Larry

Barsalou)

 

 

Presentations

 

June 2017. “Perceptual Confidence and Perceptual Inference”. Workshop on representation, University of Turin, Italy.

 

June 2017. Workshop on The Rationality of Perception. University of Liege, Belgium.

 

June 2017. Perceptual Inference – 3 lectures at Institut Jean Nicod, Paris. “Perceptual Confidence and Perceptual Inference”, “Epistemology of perceptual inference”, “Inference without reckoning”

 

June 2017. Inferences to perception. Bochum workshop on Perception and Justified Belief. Bochum, Germany.

 

May 2017. Inferences to perception. Workshop in honor of the end of the Center for the Study of Mind and Nature (CSMN). Oslo.

 

April 2017. The Rationality of Perception. Harvard Bookstore. Ethics in the World speaker series.

 

April 2017. Inference without Reckoning. NYU Mind and Language seminar.

 

April 2017. The Rationality of Perception. University of Pennsylvania.

 

April 2017. The Rationality of Perception. University of Texas/Arlington.

 

March 2017. Probability and Perception. University of California, Berkeley, Workshop on Probability and Perception.

 

March 2017. Norms of Attention. University of Southern California.

 

December 2016. Norms of Attention. Claremont McKenna Philosophy Colloquium.

 

November 2016. The Rationality of Perception. Cal State Chico.

 

October 2016. The Problem of Perceptual Hijacking. Pittsburgh Perception Conference. With comments from Matt Soteriou, Mazviita Chirimuuta and Imogen Dickie

 

October 2016. Salience Norms. UC Berkeley Philosophy Colloquium.

 

October 2016. The Problem of Culturally Normal Belief. UC Berkeley Law and Political Theory Workshop.

 

July 2016. The Mind of the World. Directors’ presentation, NEH Summer Institute on Presupposition and Perception.

 

July 2016. The Epistemology of Top-Down Effects on Perception, NEH Summer Institute on Presupposition and Perception.

 

June 2016. mini-Seminar on The Rationality of Perception. Universidad Alberto Hurtado. Santiago, Chile.

 

June 2016. Helpless Belief. Universidad Alberto Hurtado. Santiago, Chile.

 

April 2016. Can Psychology Improve Policing? Overview. Harvard University.

 

April 2016. Social Normality. Gustav Bergman lecture, University of Iowa.

 

April 2016. Epistemic Charge. University of Iowa

 

April 2016. Epistemic Charge. University of Nebraska, Lincoln

 

March 2016. Inference without Reckoning. Gail Stine Memorial Lecture, Wayne State University.

 

March 2016. Epistemic Charge. Mesthene Lecture, Rutgers University.

 

February 2016. Inference without Reckoning. UCSD Winter Philosophy of Perception Workshop.

 

January 2016. The Epistemology of Social Normality (with comments by Sally Haslanger). Yale Ideology Conference.

 

January 2016. Salience Norms. Inaugural Workshop on Thought and Sense. Oslo, CSMN.

 

December 2015. Perception and Social Forms of Consciousness. UW-Madison.

 

December 2015. Comments on John Morrison’s “Perceptual Confidence”. Workshop on Bayesian theories of Perception. NYU Center for Consciousness.

 

November 2015. Epistemic Charge. Southampton.

 

November 2015. Salience Norms. Jowett Society, Oxford.

 

November 2015. Salience Norms. Cambridge Moral Sciences Club.

 

October 2015. Epistemic Charge. Keynote Address, Midwest Epistemology Workshop. University of Missouri.

 

September 2015. Salience Norms. SWIP/NY. NYU.

 

July 2015. Comments on Sarah Moss, "A Defense of Probabilistic Knowledge". Conference on Bayesianism about perception, Cornell University.

 

June 2015. Epistemic Charge. Aristotelian Society. London.

 

April 2015. Evaluative Perception. Southern Appalachian Undergraduate Philosophy Contest. Keynote Address.

 

April 2015. Evaluative Perception. Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. President's Invited Lecture.

 

March 2015. Philosophy and Poetry: Robert Frost, Metaphor, and the Modularity of Mind. With Marissa Grunes. Arts at the Barker Center Cafe. Harvard University.

 

March 2015. Evaluative Perception. Workshop on Perception and Reasoning with Susanna Siegel. Keynote lecture. University of Tübingen.

 

March 2015. Bayesian Theories of Perception: Questions and Problems. Workshop on Cognitive Penetration and Predictive Coding. Keynote lecture. Ruhr Universitat Bochum

 

March 2015. Salience Norms and Selection Effects. University of Maryland, College Park.

 

March 2015. Comentario sobre Sofia Ortiz, La Imaginación y Experiencias Transformativas. Harvard University. 2o Taller Filosofia en EspaĖol.

 

February 2015. Epistemic Evaluability and Perceptual Farce. Cornell Society of the Humanities, Fellows' Lunch.

 

February 2015. Affordances and the Contents of Perception. Interdisciplinary Graduate Seminar, Cornell Society for the Humanities.

 

February 2015. Salience Norms and Selection Effects. Cornell Society for the Humanities.

 

February 2015. Salience Norms (with Sebastian Watzl). NYU Workshop on Norms of Inquiry.

 

January 2015. Affordances and the Contents of Perception. Sanders Seminar with Laurie Paul, UNC.

 

January 2015. The Rationality of Perception. Sociedad Filosófica Ibero-Americana. Huatulco, Oaxaca.

 

November 2014. Affordances and the Contents of Perception. University of Montreal.

 

October 2014. The Role of the Humanities in the Study of the Mind. Public discussion with Steven Pinker. Harvard.

 

October 2014. Inference and Selection Effects. NYU/Cuny grad seminar.

 

September 2014. Inference and Selection Effects. UMass/Amherst.

 

September 2014. Perceptual Inference and the Rationality of Perception. Sanders Seminar, University of Texas/Austin.

 

September 2014. Inferencia y Efectos de Seleción. UNAM, México DF.

 

June 2014. Perceptual Inference. Keynote address at 4th Annual Edinburgh Graduate Conference in Epistemology.

 

June 2014. Perceptual Inference. Conference: Perspectives on Inference. Center for the Study of Mind and Nature, Oslo.

 

April 2014. Introduccion/Introduction. Dialogo Sobre Filosofia en EspaĖol.

 

February 2014. The Rational Evaluability of Perceptual Experience. Notre Dame.

 

February 2014. The Rational Evaluability of Perceptual Experience. University of Edinburgh.

 

February 2014. The Rational Evaluability of Perceptual Experience. University of Birmingham.

 

February 2014. ņCuándo es que la pericia puede influir racionalmente en la experiencia perceptual? UAM Cuajimalpa, Mexico DF.

 

February 2014. Can Perceptual Experience be Rationally Influenced by Expertise? College of Charleston.

 

February 2014. Vice Epistemology. Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. Charleston.

 

January 2014. How is wishful seeing like wishful thinking? Arizona Ontology Conference.

 

November 2013. Affordances and the Contents of Perception. Princeton University.

 

October 2013. Affordances and the Contents of Perception. University of Copenhagen.

 

October 2013. The Rational Enrichment of Experience. University of Pittsburgh. Tamara Horowitz Memorial Lecture.

 

October 2013. Wishful Belief and the Basing Relation. Indiana University.

 

September 2013. The Rational Enrichment of Experience. Boston University.

 

September 2013. Comments on Nilanjan Das. Nyaya on Cognitive Penetrability. Mind and Attention in Indian Philosophy. Harvard.

 

September 2013. Affordances and the Contents of Perception. Workshop on Evaluative Perception.University of Glasgow.

 

August 2013. Introduction and Overview. Workshop on Imperatival Aspects of Perception. University of Oslo.

 

August 2013. Affordances and the Contents of Perception. Workshop on Imperatival Aspects of Perception. University of Oslo.

 

August 2013. Some Questions about the Unity of Consciousness. University of Bergen. Norway.

 

August 2013. Comments on Nishi Shah's "Why We Reason the Way we Do". SPAWN. Syracuse.

 

June 2013. Belief and the Basing Relation. Institut Jean Nicod.

 

June 2013. Belief and the Basing Relation. Workshop on Belief. University Autónoma de Barcelona.

 

May 2013. Discussant on The Contents of Visual Experience Seminar at UCSD.

 

May 2013. Roundtable Discussant, Workshop on Temporal Experience. Network for Sensory Research. University of Toronto.

 

May 2013. How is Wishful Seeing Like Wishful Thinking? Rutgers Epistemology Conference.

 

April 2013. Cognitive Penetration and Perceptual Justification. CUNY Reading Group on cognitive penetrability

 

April 2013. Affordancias y Contendio . UAM, Mexico DF.

 

April 2013. Los Contenidos de la Experiencia Visual. UAM, Mexico DF.

 

April 2013. Wishful Seeing and Wishful Thinking. Cornell University, guest presentation in Nico Silins's Epistemology course.

 

February 2013. How is Wishful Seeing like Wishful Thinking? Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Austin.

 

February 2013. Comments on Matt McGrath, "A Role for Looks", Invited Symposium, Central Division APA.

 

January 2013. Can Selection Effects Influence the Rational Role of Experience? Stanford University.

 

December 2012. Modularism and Top-down effects on Perception. Workshop on Modularism, NYU Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness.

 

November 2012. Affordances and the Content of Perception. University of Geneva.

 

November 2012. The Phenomenology of Efficacy. Fribourg University.

 

November 2012. Can Selection Effects Influence the Rational Role of Experience? Gareth Evans Memorial Lecture, Oxford University.

 

November 2012. Can Selection Effects Influence the Rational Role of Experience? Causes of Belief workshop, St. Andrews.

 

October 2012. Can Selection Effects Influence the Rational Role of Experience? Colloquium. NYU.

 

September 2012 Comments on Sebastian Watzl, How Attention Structures Appearances. Antwerp Conference on Attention.

 

May 2012 The Epistemology of Selection Effects. Buddhism and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. NEH Summer Institute, College of Charleston.

 

May 2012 Affordances and the Content of Perception. Buddhism and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. NEH Summer Institute, College of Charleston.

 

May 2012 Comment on Celia Hayes. Workshop on Perceptual Learning, Network for Sensory Research, University of Toronto.

 

May 2012 The Epistemology of Selection Effects. Wolfe Visual Attention Lab, Harvard Medical School.

 

 April 2012 Replies to Block, Campbell and Dretske. Pacific APA Author Meets Critics, The Contents of Visual Experience.

 

March 2012 The epistemology of selection effects. Union College.

 

February 2012 Central APA Author Meets Critics, The Contents of Visual Experience. Replies to Schellenberg, Glüer and Bengson.

 

December 2011  Stereotypes and Perceptual Belief. Psycho-ontology Conference. Shalem Center, Jerusalem, Israel.

 

December 2011  Stereotypes and Perceptual Belief. Workshop on Implicit Bias. Sheffield University.

 

October 2011 Affordances and the Contents of Perception. Symposium on Phenomenality and Intentionality in honor of Charles Siewert, Rice University.

 

 October 2011 The Epistemic Significance of top-down effects on perception. Seminar at Yale University.

 

October 2011 The Epistemic Significance of top-down effects on perception. Seminar at Johns Hopkins University.

 

October 2011 Affordances and the Contents of Perception. The Johns Hopkins University.

 

 June 2011Attention and Perceptual Justification. Columbia Perception Workshop. Columbia University.

 

May 2011        Discussant, Rutgers Epistemology Conference, Rutgers University.

 

April 2011      Attention and Perceptual Justification. Haverford College.

 

March 2011    Comments on Kurt Gray, The dual structure of morality. Metro Experimental Philosophy Research Group, NYU.

 

March 2011    Solicitaciónes y los Contentos de la Experiencia Perceptual. Universidad Nacionál de Colombia, Bogotá.

 

March 2011    The Epistemic Impact of Reasoning in the Basement. Seminar on Epistemology, Cornell University.

 

February 2011  Attention and Perceptual Justification. University of Miami.

 

February 2011 The Epistemic Impact of Reasoning in the Basement. University of Miami.

 

February 2011The Epistemic Impact of Reasoning in the Basement. Brandeis University.

 

February 2011Introduction: The perceptual impact of racial stereotypes. Radcliffe Exploratory Seminar. Radcliffe Institute.

 

  February 2011Comments on Eric Mandelbaum’s “A Psychofunctionalist Theory of Belief”. Workshop on Belief and its Cousins. Harvard University.

 

 January 2011 The Epistemic Impact of Reasoning on the Basement. LOGOS. Barcelona, Spain

 

December 2010 Commentary on talks Christopher Hill and Brain McLaughlin, Symposium on Appearance Properties. Eastern Division APA.

 

 October 2010 The Epistemic Impact of Reasoning in the Basement. 44th Chapel Hill Colloquium. Comment from Jonathan Weisberg, Toronto.

 

 August 2010 The Epistemic Impact of Reasoning in the Basement. ANU April 2010 Perceptual Downgrades. Workshop on Evidence. ARCHE/St Andrews.

 

April 2010 Perceptual Downgrades. Phenomenal Qualities Workshop. University of London, Institute of Philosophy.

 

April 2010 The significance of cognitive penetration. Formal Epistemology Festival, University of Toronto.

 

April 2010 The significance of cognitive penetration. New Directions in Philosophy of Mind. Barnard College, NYC.

 

March 2010 What are the epistemological consequences of cognitive penetration?. University of Texas, Austin.

 

March 2010 Cognitive Penetrators as Undercutters. NYU Mind and Language Seminar.

 

February 2010 Cognitive Penetrators as Undercutters. University of Western Ontario.

 

February 2010 Comments on Matthew Conduct's "Naive Realism without Disjunctivism", Online Consciousness Conference.

 

December 2009 Comments on Robert Briscoe's "My Point of View", Eastern Division APA

 

October 2009 The Perception of First-Person Causation  Keynote Address, St Andrews Graduate Conference.

 

October 2009 Perceptual Experience and Cognitive Penetrability ZIF, Bielefeld. Knowledge and Performance in Perception.

 

May 2009 “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification” Jowett Society, Oxford University.

 

April 2009 “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification”. Southern Methodist University.

 

April 2009 “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification”. University of Kentucky Graduate Conference.

 

December 2008 “What Do We See?” Neuphi, Boston University.

 

November 2008 Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification First Annual Philosophy/Psychology, DataBlitz/Speed-Philosophy Exchange, Harvard.

 

November 2008 Dreams and Intentionality Center for Sleep and Cognition, BIDMC, Harvard.

 

November 2008 “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification” The Ohio State University.

 

October 2008 “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification” University of Toronto.

 

October 2008 “Phenomenal Intentionality and Cognitive Phenomenology” Workshop on Phenomenal Intentionality, University of Arizona, Tucson.

 

September 2008 What Do We See? The Philosophical Society, University of Umeaa, Sweden.

 

September 2008 The Varieties of Perceptual Intentionality. The Burman Lectures, University of Umeaa, Sweden.

 

September 2008 The Contents of Visual Experience The Burman Lectures, University of Umeaa, Sweden.

 

September 2008 Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification Stockholm University.

 

August 2008 Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification (with comments from Maja Spener), The Role of Consciousness in Thought, Dubrovnik Inter-University Center, Croatia.

 

August 2008 The Weak Content View (with comments from Charles Travis), SPAWN, Syracuse University.

 

August 2008 Is Visual Experience a Propositional Attitude? World Congress of Philosophy, Seoul National University, South Korea.

 

April 2008 “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification” Seminar Discussion, MIT.

 

April 2008 “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification” Rutgers University.

 

April 2008 “Phenomenal Contrast and the Contents of Experience” Towards of Science of Consciousness 2008, University of Arizona.

 

March 2008 “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification” Basic Knowledge Workshop on Perceptual Justification, University of St Andrews.

 

  December 2007 “The Visual Experience of Causation” General discussion, Bates College.

 

  November 2007 “The Fact View and the Content View” Themes from Epistemological Writings of McDowell, University of Stirling.

 

  November 2007 “Do Visual Experiences Have Contents?” Glasgow Workshop on Perception and Introspection.

 

  October 2007 “Do Experiences have Contents?” Seminar discussion, Brown University.

 

  October 2007 “Do Visual Experiences Have Contents?” University of Vermont.

 

  June 2007 “Do Visual Experiences Have Contents?” ANU Workshop on Phenomenology and Intentionality.

 

  March 2007 How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience? University of Glasgow, Conference on the Admissible Contents of Experience

 

  October 2006 Do Visual Experiences Have Contents? University of London

 

  October 2006 “The Visual Experience of Causation” University of Warwick

 

  September 2006 “How Can We Find Out Which Contents Experiences Have?” Spindel Conference, Memphis, with comments by Joseph Tolliver.

 

  September 2006 “Do Visual Experiences Have Contents?” University of Mississippi, Oxford Missisippi.

 

   September 2006 Do Visual Experiences Have Contents? Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie, Berlin.

 

   May 2006 “The Visual Experience of Causation” On-line Philosophy Conference.

 

   May 2006 Comments on Sean Kelly's “Perceptual Normativity and Human Freedom” Cornell Cognitive Studies Symposium on Perception and Action.

 

   April 2006 “Do Visual Experiences Have Contents?” Amherst College.

 

   March 2006, The Visual Experience of Causation Massachusetts Bay Philosophy Alliance.

 

   February 2006 “The Phenomenology of Efficacy” University of California, Berkeley

   January 2006,6 “The Experience and Perception of Causation” Arizona Ontology Conference.

 

   October 2005 “The Phenomenology of Efficacy” MIT.

 

   October 2005 “The Phenomenology of Efficacy” University of Toronto.

 

   April 2005 “The Phenomenology of Efficacy” UMass Amherst.

 

   March 2005 Comments on  Michelle Montague's  “Russell's Principle and a Problem for Vision”  Pacific Division APA.

 

   February 2005 “Direct Realism and Perceptual Consciousness” Australian National University and Center for Consciousness.

 

   January 2005, The Phenomenology of Efficacy Australian National University.

 

   December 2004, The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference discussion at Yale University.

 

   November 2004, Direct Realism and Perceptual Consciousness Conference on The Phenomenal, University College, London.

 

   July 2004, Object-seeing and the Sensation/Perception Distinction Invited Symposium on Object Perception, SPP/ESPP, Barcelona, Spain.

 

   June 2004,  Comments on Mike Martin's "On Being Alienated", NYU Conference on Consciousness and Intentionality, La Pietra, Florence, Italy.

 

   June 2004,  Comments on Scott Sturgeon's "Apriorism about Modality", University of Konstanz, Germany.

 

   April 2004,  Discussion with Marc Hauser on Moral Judgments and Cognitive Science, Harvard Society for Mind, Brain and Behavior.

 

   April 2004,  The Phenomenology of Efficacy, Tufts University.

 

   April 2004,  The Phenomenology of Efficacy, Yale University Perception and Cognition Lab.

 

   March 2004,  How Does Visual Phenomenology Constrain Object-seeing?, Pacific Division APA.

 

   February 2004,  Particularity and Presence in Visual Perception, UCLA.

 

   February 2004,  Presupposition and Policing in Complex Demonstratives, UCLA Philosophy of Language Workshop.

 

   February 2004,  Particularity and Presence in Visual Perception, UC Irvine.

 

   February 2004, Comments on David Chalmers' "Perception and the Fall from Eden", Concepts and Content Conference, UC Santa Barbara.

 

   February 2004, Which Properties are Represented in Perception?, New York Univeristy.

 

   January 2004, Particularity and Presence in Visual Perception, University of Miami.

 

   January 2004, Particularity and Presence in Visual Perception, UC Davis.

 

   December 2003, Comments on James Pryor's “What is De Re Thought?”, Eastern Division APA.

 

   November 2003, Visual Experience and the Phenomenology of Efficacy , Workshop on the Phenomenology of Agency, University of Arizona.

 

   August 2003, Which Properties are Represented in Perception?, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

 

   August 2003, Particularity and Presence in Visual Perception, Dartmouth College.

 

   July 2003, Two Phenomenological Constraints on Object-seeing, National Yang Ming University Workshop on Consciousness, Taipei, Taiwan.

 

   July 2003, Which Properties are Represented in Perception?, National Yang Ming University Workshop on Consciousness, Taipei, Taiwan.

 

   July 2003, Presupposition and Policing in Complex Demonstratives, ANU Workshop in Philosophy of Language.

 

   June 2003, Particularity and Presence in Visual Perception, Australian National University.

 

   May 2003, Presupposition and Policing in Complex Demonstratives, Language, Mind and World Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

 

   March 2003, Comments on Noam Chomsky's Distinguished Lectures on Mind, Brain and Behavior, Harvard University.

 

   November 2002, Which Properties are Represented in Perception?, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

 

   November 2002, Which Properties are Represented in Perception?, Center for Consciousness Studies, University of Arizona, Tucson,

   

 November 2002, Object-seeing and the Mental, University of Virginia.

 

October 2002, "The Disjunctive Theory of Perception", Swarthmore College.

 

October 2002, "Are Kind-Properties Represented in Perception?” Syracuse University

 

July 2002, “Misperception”, NEH Summer Institute on Consciousness and Intentionality, UC Santa Cruz.

 

April 2002, Comments on M. G. F. Martin's "The Limits of Self-Awareness", Oberlin Colloquium on Perception.

 

 April 2002, "Misperception", Utah Colloquium on Self-Knowledge, with comments by Ned Block and Ram Neta.

    

February 2002, "Misperception", Vassar College.

 

August 2000, “Object-seeing and Phenomenal Character" European Society of Philosophy and Psychology, Fribourg, Switzerland.

 

June 2001, "Object-seeing and Unfilled Propositions" University of Rijeka, Croatia.

 

May 2001, "The Contents of Visual Experience" Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Duke University.

 

April 2001, "Demonstrative Reference: What is it?" Amherst College. Guest seminar in Philosophy department. 

 

November 2000, Object-seeing and the mental, Philosophy Department, NYU.

 

September 2000, "Object-seeing and the mental" Mental Phenomena III. Inter-university Center, Dubrovnic, Croatia.

 

 May 2000,  Raw-Feels, Truth-aptness, and visual differentiation", Cumberland Lodge, Birkbeck  College, London.

 

May 2000, Visual experience and individuation, Birkbeck College, London

 

May 1999 Viewpoint-invariance, visual experience, and the justification of demonstrative beliefs. Cognitive Science Conference on Perception, Art and Consciousness, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium.