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Harvard University Web: <http://people.fas.harvard.edu/~phillips01/>  
Cambridge, MA 02138 USA GitHub: <https://github.com/phillipsjs>
- EMPLOYMENT **Harvard University**, Cambridge, MA  
*Department of Psychology*  
Postdoctoral Fellow **2015-present**
- EDUCATION **Yale University**, New Haven, CT  
*Department of Psychology & Department of Philosophy*  
Ph.D., Psychology and Philosophy **2010-2015**
- University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill**, Chapel Hill, NC  
*Department of Philosophy*  
B.A., Philosophy, Summa Cum Laude **2008**
- FORTHCOMING & PUBLISHED PAPERS **Phillips, J.** & George, B.R. (*forthcoming*) Knowledge wh and false beliefs: Experimental investigations. *Journal of Semantics*.
- Phillips, J.** & Knobe, J. (2018) The psychological representation of modality. *Mind & Language*.
- Shtulman A. & **Phillips, J.** (2017) Differentiating *could* from *should*: Developmental changes in modal cognition. *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology*.
- Phillips, J.** & Cushman, F. (2017) Morality constrains the default representation of what is possible. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 114(18): 4649-4654.
- Phillips, J.**, De Freitas J., Mott, C., Gruber, J. & Knobe, J. (2017) True happiness: The role of morality in the folk concept of happiness. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 146(2): 165-181.
- Phillips, J.**, Luguri, J. & Knobe, J. (2015) Unifying morality's influence on non-moral judgments: The relevance of alternative possibilities. *Cognition*, 145: 30-42. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.08.001
- Phillips, J.**, Ong, D.C., Surtees, A.D.R., Xin, Y., Williams, S., Saxe, R. & Frank, M. C. (2015) A second look at automatic theory of mind: Reconsidering Kovcs, Tgls, and Endress (2010). *Psychological Science*, 26(9): 1353-1367 doi:10.1177/0956797614558717
- Kominsky, J. F., **Phillips, J.**, Gerstenberg, T., Lagnado, D., & Knobe, J. (2015) Causal superseding. *Cognition*, 137: 196-209. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.01.013
- Phillips, J.**, Nyholm, S. & Liao, S. (2014) The good in happiness. In Tania Lombrozo, Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), *Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 1*. Oxford University Press. 253-293.
- Phillips, J.** & Shaw, A. (2014) Manipulating morality: Third-party intentions alter moral judgments by changing causal reasoning. *Cognitive Science*. 39(6): 1320-1347 doi:10.1111/cogs.12194

**Phillips, J.**, Misener, L., & Knobe, J. (2011) The Ordinary Concept of Happiness (and others like it). *Emotion Review*. 3(3): 1-3. doi:10.1177/1754073911402385

Young, L. & **Phillips, J.** (2011) The Paradox of Moral Focus. *Cognition*. 119(2): 166-178. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2011.01.004

**Phillips, J.** & Knobe, J. (2009) Moral Judgments and Intuitions about Freedom. *Psychological Inquiry*. 20(1): 30-36. doi:10.1080/10478400902744279

CONFERENCE  
PROCEEDINGS

**Phillips, J.** & Kominsky, K. (2017) Causation and norms of proper functioning: Counterfactuals are (still) relevant. *Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*.

**Phillips, J.** & Cushman, F. (2016) Multiple Systems for Modal Cognition. *Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*.

**Phillips, J.**, Knobe, J., Shtulman, S., Kalish, C., Riggs, A. & Hitchcock, C. (2015) The relevance of alternative possibilities throughout cognition. *Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*.

Kominsky, J., Gerstenberg, T., **Phillips, J.**, Lagnado, D. & Knobe, J. (2014) Causal supersession. *Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*.

Ullman, D., Leite, I., **Phillips, J.**, Kim-Cohen, J., & Scassellati, B. (2014) Smart human, smarter robot: How cheating affects perceptions of social agency. *Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*.

**Phillips, J.** & Young, L. (2011) Apparent paradoxes in moral reasoning; Or how you forced him to do it, even though he wasn't forced to do it. *Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*.

OTHER  
PUBLICATIONS

Doris, J., Stich, S., **Phillips, J.** & Lachlan, D.W. (2017) Moral psychology: Empirical approaches. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

PAPERS UNDER  
REVISION/REVIEW

Khoo, J. & **Phillips, J.** (under revision) New horizons for a theory of epistemic modals. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*

**Phillips, J.** & Norby, A. (under review) Factive theory of mind.

**Phillips, J.** & Bloom, P. (under review) Do children believe immoral events are possible?

**Phillips, J.** & Mandelkern, M. (under review) 'Force': Morality and context.

GRANTS

Office of Naval Research Grant N00014-14-1-0800 written with and submitted by Fiery Cushman (PI)

HONORS AND  
AWARDS

SIAS Summer Institute Fellow: *The Investigation of Linguistic Meaning* 2015-2016

The Fredric Woodrow Knapp Fellowship Fund, Yale 2015

William Kessen Teaching Award, Yale 2013

Highest Honors in Philosophy, UNC-Chapel Hill 2008

INVITED  
PRESENTATIONS  
2015-2017

- Modal cognition in natural language. *Semantics 2018: Looking Ahead*, Amherst, MA (upcoming)
- Evidence for general-purpose default representations of possibility. *Cognitive Science Talk*, Dartmouth College, NH (2017)
- How and why morality constrains our default idea of what is possible. *Moral Mind, Brain, and Behavior Series*, SUNY Albany, NY (2017)
- Prescriptive constraints on modal cognition. *Institut Jean Nicod Colloquium*, Jean Nicod, ENS, Paris, France (2017)
- The relevance of alternative possibilities. *Experimental Psychology Society*, Belfast, UK (2017)
- Epistemic modals – Are there any? co-authored talk with Angelika Kratzer for the *David Lewis Lecture*, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ (2017)
- Factive theory of mind. *Cognitive Science Colloquium*, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Amherst, MA (2016)
- The representation of possibilities throughout cognition. *Developmental Brownbag*, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL (2016)
- The representation of alternative possibilities throughout cognition. *Cognition, Brain and Behavior Research Seminar*, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA (2015)
- Factive theory of mind. *5th Cornell Workshop in Linguistics and Philosophy*, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY (2015)
- Factive theory of mind. *The Geography of Philosophy: Knowledge, Person, Wisdom*, University of Pittsburgh HPS, Pittsburgh, PA (2015)
- The psychological representation of modality. *Institut Jean Nicod Colloquium*, Jean Nicod, ENS, Paris, France (2015)

OTHER  
PRESENTATIONS  
2015-2017

- Does morality always constrain the default representation of possibility? *Moral Psychology Research Group*, Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA (2017)
- Morality constrains the default representation of possibility. *Boston Area Social Cognition*, Boston, MA (2017)
- Causation and norms of proper functioning: Counterfactuals are (still) relevant. *Cognitive Science Society*, London, UK (2017)
- Morality constrains the default representation of possibility. *Society for Philosophy and Psychology*, Baltimore, MD (2017)
- ‘Force’: Topicalization, context-sensitivity, and morality. *Society for Philosophy and Psychology*, Baltimore, MD (2017)
- Differentiating “could” from “should”: Developmental changes in modal cognition. *Society for Philosophy and Psychology*, Baltimore, MD (2017)
- Whats in a cause? Counterfactual relevance and hierarchical event structure in causal judgments. *Society for Philosophy and Psychology*, Baltimore, MD (2017)

Subjectivity in Force: Topicalization, Context-Sensitivity, and Morality. *Subjectivity in Language and Thought* at the University of Chicago, Chicago, IL (2017)

Experimenting with Modals. *Subjectivity in Language and Thought* at the University of Chicago, Chicago, IL (2017)

Developing expectations of third-party fairness. *Society for Research in Child Development*, Austin, TX (2017)

Evidence for general-purpose default representations of possibility. *Cognition, Brain and Behavior Research Seminar*, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA (2017)

Experimenting with Modals. *Perspective Expressions: Empirical Approaches* at New York University, New York, NY (2017)

Morality constrains the default representation of possibility *Yale-NYU Workshop on Essentialism* at New York University, New York, NY (2017)

Multiple systems for modal cognition. *Cognitive Science Society*, Philadelphia, PA (2016)

The psychological representation of modality *International Conference on Thinking*, Providence, RI (2016)

Panel on embedded questions at the *Attitudes and Questions Workshop* at CMU, Pittsburgh, PA (2016)

Knowledge before belief: Response times indicate evaluations of knowledge prior to belief in human adults. *International Conference on Infant Studies*, New Orleans, LA (2016)

Truth-Conditions of Knowledge-wh Ascriptions: Experimental Approaches. *Pacific American Philosophical Association* session on experimental philosophy of language, San Francisco, CA (2016)

Can Empirical Evidence Be Brought to Bear on Our Choice of Semantic Framework? A Case Study Involving Epistemic Modals. *Pacific American Philosophical Association* session on experimental philosophy of language, San Francisco, CA (2016)

The psychological representation of modality. *Cognitive Science Society* symposium on the relevance of alternative possibilities throughout cognition, Pasadena, CA (2015)

Knowledge before belief; Response times indicate evaluations of knowledge prior to belief. *Society for Philosophy and Psychology*, Durham, NC (2015)

Unifying morality's influence on non-moral judgments: The relevance of alternative possibilities. *Society for Philosophy and Psychology*, Durham, NC (2015)

Core theory of mind. *Society for Philosophy and Psychology*, Durham, NC (2015)

Is that all there is to happiness? *Society for Personality and Social Psychology*, Long Beach, CA (2015)

Impossibly wrong: How beliefs about possibility are shaped by morality, and why it matters. *Society for Personality and Social Psychology*, Preconference on Common-Sense Beliefs and Lay Theories, Long Beach, CA (2015)

PROFESSIONAL  
ACTIVITIES

Ad hoc reviewer for *Child Development*, *Cognition*, *Cognitive Development*, *Cognitive Science*, *Frontiers in Psychology*, *International Journal of Psychology*, *JEP:General*, *JEP: Learning, Memory, and Cognition*, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *The Monist*, *National Science Center, Poland*, *Psychological Science*, *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*, *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *Philosophical Psychology*, *Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society*, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, *Review of Philosophy and Psychology*, *Trends in Cognitive Science*

Member of the Moral Psychology Research Group (2012-present)

Program chair for the annual meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (2016)

Steering Committee for the Postdoctoral portion of Harvard's Mind Brain and Behavior (MBB) Initiative (2015-2016)

Executive Committee member of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (2012-2015)

COURSES  
INSTRUCTED

**Yale University**

Introduction to Cognitive Science	2012
Perspectives on Human Nature	2013
Research Methods in Psychology	2013
Philosophy of Religion	2014

REFERENCES

Paul Bloom  
Psychology  
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Psychology  
Boston College  
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Linguistics  
University of Massachusetts, Amherst  
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