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- EMPLOYMENT **Harvard University**, Cambridge, MA  
*Department of Psychology*
- Postdoctoral Fellow **2015-present**
- EDUCATION **Yale University**, New Haven, CT  
*Department of Philosophy & Department of Psychology*
- Ph.D., Philosophy and Psychology **2010-2015**
- University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill**, Chapel Hill, NC  
*Department of Philosophy*
- B.A., Philosophy, Summa Cum Laude **2008**
- FORTHCOMING PAPERS **Phillips, J.** & Cushman, F. (*forthcoming*) Morality constrains the default representation of what is possible. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*.
- Phillips, J.** & Knobe, J. (*forthcoming*) The psychological representation of modality. *Mind & Language*.
- PUBLISHED PAPERS **Phillips, J.**, De Freitas J., Mott, C., Gruber, J. & Knobe, J. (2017) True happiness: The role of morality in the folk concept of happiness. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 146(2): 165-181.
- Phillips, J.**, Luguri, J. & Knobe, J. (2015) Unifying morality's influence on non-moral judgments: The relevance of alternative possibilities. *Cognition*, 145: 30-42. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.08.001
- Phillips, J.**, Ong, D.C., Surtees, A.D.R., Xin, Y., Williams, S., Saxe, R. & Frank, M. C. (2015) A second look at automatic theory of mind: Reconsidering Kovcs, Tgls, and Endress (2010). *Psychological Science*, 26(9): 1353-1367 doi:10.1177/0956797614558717
- Kominsky, J. F., **Phillips, J.**, Gerstenberg, T., Lagnado, D., & Knobe, J. (2015) Causal superseding. *Cognition*, 137: 196-209. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.01.013
- Phillips, J.**, Nyholm, S. & Liao, S. (2014) The good in happiness. In Tania Lombrozo, Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), *Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 1*. Oxford University Press. 253-293.
- Phillips, J.** & Shaw, A. (2014) Manipulating morality: Third-party intentions alter moral judgments by changing causal reasoning. *Cognitive Science*. 39(6): 1320-1347 doi:10.1111/cogs.12194
- Phillips, J.**, Misenheimer, L., & Knobe, J. (2011) The Ordinary Concept of Happiness (and others like it). *Emotion Review*. 3(3): 1-3. doi:10.1177/1754073911402385

Young, L. & **Phillips, J.** (2011) The Paradox of Moral Focus. *Cognition*. 119(2): 166-178. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2011.01.004

**Phillips, J.** & Knobe, J. (2009) Moral Judgments and Intuitions about Freedom. *Psychological Inquiry*. 20(1): 30-36. doi:10.1080/10478400902744279

CONFERENCE  
PROCEEDINGS

**Phillips, J.** & Kominsky, K. (forthcoming) Causation and norms of proper functioning: Counterfactuals are (still) relevant *Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*.

**Phillips, J.** & Cushman, F. (2016) Multiple Systems for Modal Cognition. *Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*.

**Phillips, J.**, Knobe, J., Shtulman, S., Kalish, C., Riggs, A. & Hitchcock, C. (2015) The Relevance of Alternative Possibilities throughout Cognition *Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*.

Kominsky, J., Gerstenberg, T., **Phillips, J.**, Lagnado, D. & Knobe, J. (2014) Causal supersession. *Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*.

Ullman, D., Leite, I., **Phillips, J.**, Kim-Cohen, J., & Scassellati, B. (2014) Smart human, smarter robot: How cheating affects perceptions of social agency. *Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*.

**Phillips, J.** & Young, L. (2011) Apparent paradoxes in moral reasoning; Or how you forced him to do it, even though he wasn't forced to do it. *Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*.

PAPERS UNDER  
REVISION/REVIEW

**Phillips, J.** & George, B.R. (*under revision*) Non-reducibility with Knowledge *wh*: Experimental investigations.

**Phillips, J.** & Bloom, P. (*under revision*) Do children believe immoral events are magical?

Shtulman A. & **Phillips, J.** (*revised resubmission*) Differentiating *Could* from *Should*: Developmental changes in modal cognition.

**Phillips, J.** & Norby, A. (*under review*) Factive Theory of Mind.

**Phillips, J.** & Kominsky, J. (*under review*) Causation and norms of proper functioning: Counterfactuals are (still) relevant.

GRANTS

Office of Naval Research Grant N00014-14-1-0800 written with and submitted by Fiery Cushman (PI)

HONORS AND  
AWARDS

SIAS Summer Institute Fellow: *The Investigation of Linguistic Meaning* 2015-2016

The Fredric Woodrow Knapp Fellowship Fund, Yale 2015

William Kessen Teaching Award, Yale 2013

Highest Honors in Philosophy, UNC-Chapel Hill 2008

INVITED  
PRESENTATIONS  
2015-2017

Moral constraints on modal cognition. *Institut Jean Nicod Colloquium*, Jean Nicod, ENS, Paris, France (*upcoming*)

The relevance of alternative possibilities *Experimental Psychology Society*, Belfast, UK (2017)

Epistemic modals – Are there any? co-authored talk with Angelika Kratzer for the *David Lewis Lecture*, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ (2017)

Factive theory of mind. *Cognitive Science Colloquium*, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Amherst, MA (2016)

The representation of possibilities throughout cognition. *Developmental Brownbag*, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL (2016)

The representation of alternative possibilities throughout cognition. *Cognition, Brain and Behavior Research Seminar*, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA (2015)

Factive theory of mind. *5th Cornell Workshop in Linguistics and Philosophy*, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY (2015)

Factive theory of mind. *The Geography of Philosophy: Knowledge, Person, Wisdom*, University of Pittsburgh HPS, Pittsburgh, PA (2015)

The psychological representation of modality. *Institut Jean Nicod Colloquium*, Jean Nicod, ENS, Paris, France (2015)

OTHER  
PRESENTATIONS  
2015-2017

Causation and norms of proper functioning: Counterfactuals are (still) relevant *Cognitive Science Society*, London, UK (*upcoming*)

Morality constrains the default representation of possibility *Society for Philosophy and Psychology*, Baltimore, MD (*upcoming*)

Subjectivity in Force: Topicalization, Context-Sensitivity, and Morality. *Subjectivity in Language and Thought* at University of Chicago, Chicago, IL (*upcoming*)

Experimenting with Modals. *Subjectivity in Language and Thought* at University of Chicago, Chicago, IL (*upcoming*)

Developing expectations of third-party fairness. *Society for Research in Child Development*, Austin, TX (2017)

Experimenting with Modals. *Perspective Expressions: Empirical Approaches* at New York University, New York, NY (2017)

Morality constrains the default representation of possibility *Yale-NYU Workshop on Essentialism* at New York University, New York, NY (2017)

Panel on free will for the Brain and Cognitive Sciences department at MIT, Cambridge, MA (2016)

Multiple systems for modal cognition. *Cognitive Science Society*, Philadelphia, PA (2016)

The psychological representation of modality *International Conference on Thinking*, Providence, RI (2016)

Panel on embedded questions at the *Attitudes and Questions Workshop* at CMU, Pittsburgh, PA (2016)

Knowledge before belief: Response times indicate evaluations of knowledge prior to belief in human adults. *International Conference on Infant Studies*, New Orleans, LA (2016)

Truth-Conditions of Knowledge-wh Ascriptions: Experimental Approaches. *Pacific American Philosophical Association* session on experimental philosophy of language, San Francisco, CA (2016)

Can Empirical Evidence Be Brought to Bear on Our Choice of Semantic Framework? A Case Study Involving Epistemic Modals. *Pacific American Philosophical Association* session on experimental philosophy of language, San Francisco, CA (2016)

The psychological representation of modality. *Cognitive Science Society* symposium on the relevance of alternative possibilities throughout cognition, Pasadena, CA (2015)

Knowledge before belief; Response times indicate evaluations of knowledge prior to belief. *Society for Philosophy and Psychology*, Durham, NC (2015)

Unifying morality's influence on non-moral judgments: The relevance of alternative possibilities. *Society for Philosophy and Psychology*, Durham, NC (2015)

Core theory of mind. *Society for Philosophy and Psychology*, Durham, NC (2015)

Is that all there is to happiness? *Society for Personality and Social Psychology*, Long Beach, CA (2015)

Impossibly wrong: How beliefs about possibility are shaped by morality, and why it matters. *Society for Personality and Social Psychology*, Preconference on Common-Sense Beliefs and Lay Theories, Long Beach, CA (2015)

#### PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Ad hoc reviewer for *Child Development*, *Cognition*, *Cognitive Development*, *Cognitive Science*, *Frontiers in Psychology*, *JEP:General*, *JEP: Learning, Memory, and Cognition*, *National Science Center, Poland*, *Psychological Science*, *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*, *The Monist*, *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *Philosophical Psychology*, *Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society*, *Review of Philosophy and Psychology*

Member of the Moral Psychology Research Group (2012-present)

Program chair for the annual meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (2016)

Steering Committee for the Postdoctoral portion of Harvard's Mind Brain and Behavior (MBB) Initiative (2015-2016)

Executive Committee member of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (2012-2015)

#### COURSES INSTRUCTED

##### **Yale University**

Philosophy of Religion	2014
Research Methods in Psychology	2013
Perspectives on Human Nature	2013
Introduction to Cognitive Science	2012

REFERENCES

Paul Bloom (paul.bloom@yale.edu)  
Psychology  
Yale University

Joshua Knobe (joshua.knobe@yale.edu)  
Cognitive Science and Philosophy  
Yale University

Fiery Cushman (cushman@fas.harvard.edu)  
Psychology  
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Liane Young (liane.young@bc.edu)  
Psychology  
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Laurie Santos (laurie.santos@yale.edu)  
Psychology and Cognitive Science  
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