My research falls in the intersection of psychology, philosophy, and linguistics, and fits most easily within the broader umbrella of cognitive science. Much of the work I've done is related in one way or another to the psychological representation of modality — the way our minds represent possibilities. I have also done research on Theory of Mind, causal reasoning, moral judgment, formal semantics, and happiness.
I earned my Ph.D. in Philosophy and Psychology at Yale in 2015, and I'm currently housed in Harvard's Moral Psychology Research Lab.
Unifying morality's influence on non-moral judgments: The relevance of alternative possibilities
A second look at automatic theory of mind: Reconsidering Kovács, Téglás, and Endress (2010)
The good in happiness
Manipulating morality: Third-party intentions alter moral judgments by changing causal reasoning
The paradox of moral focus
The ordinary concept of happiness
(and others like it)
Moral judgments and intuitions about freedom
Submitted / Working Papers
The psychological representation of modality
Phillips, J. & Knobe, J. (submitted)
Morality constrains the default representation of what is possible
Phillips, J. & Cushman, F. (submitted)
Non-Reducibility with Knowledge wh
Phillips, J. & George, B.R. (submitted)
Causation and norms of proper functioning: Counterfactuals are (still) relevant.
Phillips, J., Kominsky, J. (submitted)
Do children believe immoral events are magical?
Phillips, J. & Bloom, P. (submitted)
Factive Theory of Mind
Norby, A. & Phillips, J. (working paper)
Moral bias in children's predictions of others
Phillips, J. & Bloom, P. (working paper)
Phillips, J. & Worsnip, A. (working paper)